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THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
MANNING GILBERT WARREN III*
I. INTRODUCTION
The European Community (EC), as part of its mandate under the Treaty
of Rome' to create a single internal market by 1992,2 has enacted an EC-wide
prohibition on insider trading.3 .The EC's "Council Directive Coordinating Re-
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port. He also gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Jenny Thomas Puryear, his research
assistant, in the final preparation of this article.
1. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. The founding members of the EC were Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany, which had previously formed the European
Coal and Steel Community. See generally D. WYArr & A. DAsHwOOD, TIn SuBsTANTaVE LAW
OF THE EEC (1987). They were joined by Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973,
Greece in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. Id. The Treaty of Rome, establishing the
European Economic Community, often referred to as the common market, is a constitutional
document by nature. Its articles are divided into six areas: (1) Principles of the Community,
articles 1-8; (2) Foundations of the Community, articles 9-84; (3) Policy of the Community,
articles 85-130; (4) The Association of Overseas Countries and Territories, articles 131-136; (5)
Institutions of the Community, articles 137-209; and (6) General and Final Provisions, articles
210-248. 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1 121.01-.95.
2. The EC's 1992 program originally was outlined in the EC Commission's special report,
COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: WHITE PAPER FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN
CouNcn. (1985). The white paper addressed a broad range of issues and proposed some 300
directives, legislative mandates to the member states, designed to produce a high degree of reg-
ulatory harmony in the common market. The Single European Act, 30 O.J. Etn. COMM. (No.
L 169) 1 (1987), 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 21,000 [hereinafter Single European Act],
amending the Treaty of Rome, embraced these proposals and the December 31, 1992 goal for a
single market "without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured." Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 8(a). See generally M. CALINGAERT,
THE 1992 CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMIMNITY'S INTERNAL
MARKET (1988); P. CEccHiNi, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MAR-
KET (1988); M. EMERSON, THE EcONOMICS OF 1992: THE EC COMMISSION's ASSESSMENT OF THE
ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET (1988); Anderson, Inadequate Imple-
mentation of EEC Directives: A Roadblock on the Way to 1992?, 11 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 91 (1988); Jones, Putting '1992' In Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 463 (1989);
Meessen, Europe en Route to 1992: The Completion of the Internal Market and Its Impact on
Non-Europeans, 23 INT'L LAW. 359 (1989).
3. Council Directive 89/592 Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 32 O.J. EUR.
Comm. (No. L 334) 30 (1989), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1761 [hereinafter Insider Trading
Directive].
From the date the Insider Trading Directive was first proposed, numerous articles have
been written detailing its provisions. See generally Appel & Wegen, The EEC Directive on In-
sider Trading, 22 REv. Sac. & COMMODITIEs REG. 137 (1989) ; Cruickshank, Insider Trading in
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gulations on Insider Dealing' 4 (Insider Trading Directive) is a mandatory model
the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345 (1982); Dine, The Insider Trading Directive, 22 L. Soc'y
Gaz., June 7, 1989, at 23; Fornasier, The Directive on Insider Dealing, 13 FoiRDAM INT'L L.J.
149 (1989-90); Hannigan, Regulating Insider Dealing: The EEC Dimension, 1 J. INT'L Bus. L.
11 (1989); Hopt, The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MKT. L. RaV. 51 (1990)
[hereinafter Hopt, European Directive]; Schodermeir & Wallach, The EEC Insider Directive
Approaching Final Adoption, 5 J. INT'L Bus. L. 234 (1989); Warren, Global Harmonization of
Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Communities, 31 HARv. INT'L L. J. 185
(1990); Comment, Insider Trading and the EEC: Harmonization of the Insider Trading Laws of
the Member States, 8 B.C. INT'L Comr. L. REV. 151 (1985); Note, Toward the Unification of
European Capital Markets: The EEC's Proposed Directive on Insider Trading, 11 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 432 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Toward Unification]; Note, Securities-Insider Trad-
ing- The Effects of the New EEC Draft Insider Trading Directive, 18 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L.
119 (1988); Note, Toward a Definition of Insider Trading, 41 STAN. L. REv. 377 (1989); Note,
A Comparative Analysis of the European Community Insider Trading Directive, 3 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 231 (1990) [hereinafter, Note, A Comparative Analysis]; Note, A New Look at the Euro-
pean Economic Community Directive on Insider Trading, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (1990)
[hereinafter, Note, A New Look].
In addition, in recent years insider trading regulation under various national laws has been
the subject of much commentary. See generally Banoff, The Regulation of Insider Trading in
the United States, United Kingdom and Japan, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 145 (1988);
Blum, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-Restraint?, 7 Nw.
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 507 (1986); Bornstein & Dugger, International Regulation of Insider Trading,
1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 375; Briner, Insider Trading in Switzerland, 10 INT 'L Bus. LAw. 348
(1982); Duhot, French Regulations on Disclosure Obligations and on Insider Trading, 2 INT'L
Bus. LAW. 96 (1974); Hawes, Lee & Robert, Insider Trading Law Developments: An Interna-
tional Analysis, 14 LAW & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 335 (1982); Herne, Inside Information: Defini-
tions in Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S., 8 J. COMP. Bus. & CAP. MKT. L. 1 (1986);
Hopt, Insider Trading on the Continent, 4 J. Comp. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 379 (1982); Hopt,
The German Insider Trading Guidelines-Spring-Gun or Scarecrow?, 8 J. Comp. Bus. & CAP.
MKT. L. 381 (1986) [hereinafter Hopt, German Guidelines]; Houle, Survey of National Legis-
lation Regulating Insider Trading, 9 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 209 (1988); Huss & Leete,
Insider Trading Regulations: A Comparison of Judicial and Statutory Sanctions, 25 AM. Bus.
L.J. 301 (1987); Ishizumi, Insider Trading Regulation: An Examination of Section 16(b) and a
Proposal for Japan, 47 FORDHAM L. REV. 449 (1979); Kraus, Securities Regulation in Germany?
Investors' Remedies for Misleading Statements by Issuers, 18 INT'L LAW. 109 (1984); Lee &
Bishara, Securities Regulation and Market Efficiency, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 247 (1985);
Lightburn, Insider Trading in France, 7 INT'L FIN. L. REV. 23 (1988); Lowenfeld, Bank Secrecy
and Insider Trading: The Banca della Svizzera Italiana Case, 15 REV. SEC. REG. 942 (1982);
Patterson, Insider Trading and Business Ethics, 1984 N.Z.L.J. 369; Pillai, Insider Trading in
Singapore and Malaysia, 16 MALAYA L. REV. 333 (1974); Rosenbaum, Simmonds, Simpson &
Vaidila, Corporate and Investment Attitudes Towards Insider Trading in Canada, 8 CAN. BUS.
L.J. 485 (1984); Rundfelt, Insider Trading: Regulation in Europe, 10 J. ACCT., AUD. & FIN.
125 (1986); Sarna, Japan and Insider Trading: Some Problems When There Are Different Def-
initions of Right and Wrong, 14 ILSA J. INT'L L. 67 (1990); Shimada & Rose, Japan's New
Penal Provisions Concerning Insider Trading, 3 BUTTERWORTHS J. INT'L BANKING & FIN. L. 462
(1988); Sorin, The Regulation of Trading by Insiders and Obligations to Disclose in the United
States, 2 INT'L Bus. LAW. 81 (1974); Tatsuta, Enforcement of Japanese Securities Legislation, 1
J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEc. REG. 95, 112 (1978); Tunc, The Reform of French Insider Trading
Law, 4 COMPANY LAW. 205 (1983); Wallace, Who Is Subject to the Prohibition Against Insider
Trading: A Comparative Study of American, British and French Law, 15 Sw. U.L. REV. 217
(1985); Zoglin, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the Japanese Equity
Market into the Global Securities Market, 1987 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 419; Comment, Recent
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act' setting forth the minimal regulatory prohibition that must be implemented
by national legislation in all twelve EC member states by June 1, 1992.6 The
directive, in essence, requires each of the member states to prohibit two defined
groups of persons, referred to as primary and secondary insiders, from taking
advantage of nonpublic, price-sensitive information relating to issuers or their
securities; to prohibit primary insiders, a group which excludes tippees, from
disclosing that information, explicitly or implicitly, to others; and to mandate
prompt public disclosure of all price-sensitive information by firms whose se-
curities are publicly traded in a regulated market. The directive, a hybrid mod-
eled largely on the insider trading laws of France7 and the United Kingdom,8 is
intended to level the playing field for market participants and to promote in-
vestor confidence in the newly-integrated securities markets of the member states.9
Developments in Insider Trading Laws and Problems of Enforcement in Great Britain, 12 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 265 (1989); Note, Insider Trading and the Internationalization of the
Securities Markets, 27 CoLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 409 (1989); Note, Regulation of Insider Trad-
ing in Hong Kong, 10 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 647 (1987); Note, A Comparative
Analysis of Insider Trading Laws: The United States, the United Kingdom and Japan-The
Current International Agreements on Securities Regulation, 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 167
(1989); Comment, West German Bank Secrecy: A Barrier to SEC Insider-Trading Investigations,
20 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REv. 609 (1987); Note, Icarus and His Waxen Wings: Congress Attempts
to Address the Challenges of Insider Trading in a Globalized Securities Market, 23 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 99 (1990).
4. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3.
5. The Treaty of Rome provides for EC legislation, either in the form of regulations or
directives, requiring the member states to enact prescribed domestic legislation. Treaty of Rome,
supra note 1, art. 100. The Treaty states that "[a] directive shall be binding, as to the result to
be achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed, but shall leave the national
authorities the choice of forms and methods." Id. art. 189. Directives are "the classic method
of integrating Community policy into the national law of the member states." Thieffry, Van-
Doorn & Lowe, The Single European Market: A Practioner's Guide to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L &
Coup. L. REv. 357, 360 (1989). The "overwhelming proportion" of the EC's efforts to har-
monize member state laws in the fields of corporate and securities laws have taken the form of
directives.' R. BUXBAUM & K. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS ENTERPRISE:
CORPORATE AND CAPITAL MARKET LAW, HARMONIZATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE U.S.A.
232 (INTEGRATION THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE vol. 4,
1988) [hereinafter BUXBAUM & HOPT]. On directives generally, see Bieber, Legislative Procedure
for the Establishment of the Single Market, 25 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 711 (1988).
6. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 14.
7. Ordonnance No. 67-833 du 28 septembre 1967; art. 10, J.O., Sept. 29, 1967, at 9589,
1967 D.S.L. 373. The current provision, Article 10-1, was amended to the Ordonnance by Loi
No. 70-1208 du 23 d~cembre 1970, art. 4, J.O., Dec. 24, 1970, at 11891, 1971 D.S.L. 17; amended
by Loi No. 82-1172 du 31 d~cembre 1982, art. 35, J.O., Jan. 1, 1983 at-15, 1983 D.S.L. 86;
also amended by Loi No. 88-70 du 22 janvier 1988, art. 16, J.O., Jan. 23, 1988, at 1111, 1988
D.S.L. 133. The Commission des Operation de Bourse (COB) recently adopted a set of insider
trading regulations, although its statutory authority has been questioned. See COB Draws Up
Tougher Insider Trading Rules, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 12, at 2 (May 21, 1990).
8. The Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22; reenacted, Company Securities (Insider Dealing)
Act, 1985, ch. 8; amended, Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, which allows civil remedies.
See Note, Toward Unification, supra note 3, at 432.
9. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
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The EC hardly succeeds in these purposes. The directive grants the member
states a wide margin of discretion in their transformation of the directive into
their own national laws. It fails to label insider trading as a crime and expressly
prescribes no penalties or civil remedies. Seen in the best light, the directive
establishes a new moral: Insider trading is now, for the first time, a European
sin and, henceforth, a public wrong for market participants. Seen in the worst
light, the directive merely assists the EC in its promotion of a dangerous im-
agery of regulation: the directive's denunciation of insider trading conveys the
false impression of a comprehensively-regulated marketplace. This image, fram-
ing the EC's regulatory system as a paragon of regulatory virtue, recommends
the EC's marketplace to the international investment community and to regu-
latory authorities, particularly those in the United States, who are under in-
creased political pressure to accord reciprocal treatment to EC firms.10
Before exploring the legislative development of the Insider Trading Direc-
tive and its specific prohibitions, one should first take notice of the traditions
it ostensibly would circumscribe. When the EC Commission first initiated delib-
erations on an insider trading directive in 1976," only France had enacted a
prohibition,' 2 and even there it was rarely, if ever, enforced. 3 At the time the
directive was actually proposed four years ago, only three member states-
France, the United Kingdom and Denmark-had proscribed insider trading as
a crime.'4 The other nine countries in the EC had either voluntary schemes or
no regulation at all. Indeed, prior to the 1980's, securities regulation in the
common market, at least outside Great Britain, was virtually non-existent."
Clearly, as one writer has noted, "the rest of the world doesn't share American
revulsion to insider trading, nor do other countries give their regulators strong
powers or resources to ferret out wrongdoers.' 6 According to an EC official,
insider trading "is considered a very normal consequence, and not a bad thing
10. Warren, Euroequity Offerings: A Preliminary Note on Worldwide Regulatory Har-
mony, 5 GESTION 2000 MANAGEMENT & PROSPECTIVE 17 (1989) [hereinafter Warren, Euroequity
Offerings].
11. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 7. The French law prohibits two types of individuals from trading on
inside information: "Direct" and "indirect" insiders. Direct insiders generally include executives
and their spouses. Indirect insiders include all others, who as a result of their profession, have
access to inside information. Note, Toward Unification, supra note 3, at 440-41. While both of
these categories are covered by the directive, French law traditionally has not provided a corre-
sponding prohibition against tippees. Id. In addition, under the 1970 law, only individuals, not
corporations, can be guilty of insider trading. Note, A New Look, supra note 3, at 159.
13. The COB, charged with enforcement of the French prohibition, has not been viewed
as an effective regulatory agency. As one writer described the agency, "[a]s stockmarket watch-
dog, it bites with its gums." A Pungent French Tale of Socks and Shares, EcoNohusT, Feb. 4,
1989, at 43 [hereinafter A Pungent French Tale].
14. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider
Trading, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 153) 8 (1987) (explanatory memorandum, para. 2, at 2)
[hereinafter First Proposal].
15. Interview with Professor L.C.B. Gower, in London (Nov. 21, 1988).
16. Putka, Insider Trading Raises Fewer Hackles Abroad, Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at
36, col. 1.
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to profit from information you happen to have.' ' 7 It is hard to disagree with
the statement that "insider trading is rampant in Europe,"'" an observation
borne out in a number of highly-publicized recent scandals.' 9 No one in Europe,
even in those few states that have criminalized insider trading, has ever gone to
jail for it.20 Insider trading is endemic in Italy, France and Spain, countries
described by one investment banker as "cowboy country."'2' Insider trading in
Germany has been viewed "simply as a lucky tip." 2 As an Economist survey
wryly observed, "West Germany and France assumed until recently that insider
trading was what financial life was all about."' z These reflections illustrate a
tradition, a set of widely-held attitudes, shared by both the regulated, the re-
gulators and the courts,m that likely will prove resistant to the behavioral mod-
ification the Insider Trading Directive seeks to accomplish.
17. Forman, Old World Traditions Include Insider Trading, Wall St. J., Feb. 8, 1989, at
CI, col. 3.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., A. RotrrIR, LA REPUBLIQUE DES Loups (1989); G. SENGbS & F. LA-
BROUILLtRE, LA PItGE DE WALL STREET (1989); A Pungent French Tale, supra note 13; Lark de
Triomphe, EcoNonsT, Jan. 28, 1989, at 77; Studer, Swiss Banker Bought Suchard Stock Before
Bid, Wall St. J., Jan. 4, 1991, at A4, col. 3; Browning, France Wants 5 to Be Charged in Insider
Case, Wall St. J., May 31, 1990, at All, col. 4; London's Stock Exchange Probes Possible
Targets of Bank Raids, Wall St. J., Nov. 7, 1990, at Cl, col. 4; Kamm, Five Indicted in France
for Trading of Triangle Shares During Takeover, Wall St. J., Feb. 17, 1989, at All, col. 2;
Greenhouse, Modest Insider-Trading Stir Is a Huge Scandal in France, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30,
1989, at Dl, col. 1; Betts, 'Mole' Hunt in French Insider-Dealing Case, Fin. Times, Jan. 20,
1989, at 2, col. 1; Toman & Forman, Dismissalsfor Alleged Insider Trading Trip Up Nat West's
Investment Bank, Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1988, at 16, col. 5; Ricks, Insider Trading Charges Filed
Against Collier, Wall St. J., July 27, 1988, at 4, col. 1; Forman, Britain Moves Closer to Deci-
sion On Insider Cases, Wall St. J., Mar. 7, 1988, at 23, col. 1; Guinness Takes $200M Charge
Due to Boesky, Newsday, Apr. 24, 1987, at 45, col. 1; Lohr, Guinness Scandall Roils Britain,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1987, at DI, col. 3; U.K. Launches an Investigation into Guinness, Wall
St. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 37, col. 1; Lohr, Ouster at London Stock Firm, N.Y. Times, Nov. 12,
1986, at D5, col. 1.
20. Forman, supra note 17. It must be conceded, of course, that no one ever went to jail
for insider trading before the golden anniversary of the federal statute. The Insider Trading
Sanctions Act of 1984: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1984) (statement of Senator
Proxmire).
21. Forman, supra note 17.
22. Insider Trading Law Possible, Says Exchange Chief Von Rosen, 2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 9, at 3-4 (Apr. 12, 1989). Under Germany's voluntary insider trading guidelines,
"scandals are quickly swept under the carpet," and "critics claim there is a widespread bending
of the rules." German Insider Trading: Behind the Times, ECONOMIST, July 13, 1991 at 86.
German officials, in the wake of recent insider trading allegations against Deutsche Bank staff,
have conceded that hopes for Germany to become a major international marketplace "are slim
if foreigners reckon that Germany is more ready than its competitors to tolerate insider-manip-
ulated markets." Id. Although Germany "reluctantly accepted" the Insider Trading Directive,
"so far the Germans have not made clear just how tough they plan to be." Id.
23. A Survey of Europe's Internal Market, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 15 [hereinafter
ECONOMIST 1992 Suavay].
24. See Insider Trading in Europe: A Daft Draft, EcoNoMIsT, May 20, 1989, at 86 [here-
inafter A Daft Draft]. According to the author, one of the major enforcement problems is
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Traditions, however, are not immutable. The EC deserves considerable rec-
ognition for its surprising achievements during the last ten years. Its primary
goal has been the harmonization of twelve widely disparate regulatory regimes,
thereby eliminating regulatory obstacles to a unified European financial market.
In its pursuit of harmony, the EC initially sought to establish commonality, 
2
or a set of uniform or substantially equivalent rules. To hasten the pace, the
EC moved to the reciprocity approach, 26 establishing substantially equivalent
minimum standards and mandating mutual recognition by each member state
of the regimes enacted by others. In the field of corporate law, the EC has
adopted directives governing corporate formation, 27 mergers, 28 financial state-
ments,29 and auditors.3 0 In the field of securities law, the EC has adopted direc-
judicial attitude: "Some judges still treat insider trading as a gentlemanly misunderstanding
rather than a crime." Id. at 87. Others may view the emergent "new morality" simply as a
"struggle between envy and greed." J. DALHuISEN, THE NEw U.K. SEcuRrriES LEGISLATION AND
THE E.C. 1992 PROGAM 138 (1989).
25. Warren, Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the European Com-
munities, 31 HARv. Ir'L L.J. 185, 198 (1990) [hereinafter Warren]. As opposed to the reciprocity
approach, commonality sought to achieve harmonization among member states' laws through de-
tailed common requirements, which proved to be politically infeasible. M. CAUNGAERT, THE 1992
CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OF =a EURoPEAN Com iUNITY's INTERNAL MARKET 33,
53, 59 (1988). See Jones, Putting "1992" in Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L & Bus. L. 463, 469-70
(1989).
26. Warren, supra note 25, at 198. Directives proposed under the new reciprocity approach
prescribe only basic, essential principles. Id. See also Roth, The European Economic Community's
Law on Services: Harmonization, 25 COMMON MKT. L. Rav. 35 (1988).
27. Council Directive 68/151 on the Coordination of Safeguards Which, for the Protection of
the Interest of Members and Others, Are Required by Member States of Companies Within the
Meaning of Article 58(2) of the Treaty, With a View to Making Such Safeguards Equivalent
Throughout the Community, 11 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 65) 8 (1968), 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1351; Council Directive 77/91 on Coordination of Safeguards, Which for the Protection
of the Interests of Members and Others, Are Required by Member States of Companies Within the
Meaning of the Second Paragraph of Article 58 of the Treaty, in Respect of the Formation of Public
Limited Liability Companies and the Maintenance and Alteration of Their Capital, With a View to
Making Such Safeguards Equivalent, 20 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 26) 1 (1977), 1 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 1355.
28. Council Directive 78/855 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty Concerning Mergers of
Public Limited Liability Companies, 21 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 295) 36 (1978), 1 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 1361. See also Council Regulation 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between
Undertakings (Merger Control Regulation), 32 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 395) 1 (1989), 2 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2839. See generally DeSmedt & Vandersanden, The EC Merger Control Regu-
lation, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. Rav. 437 (1990); Satzky, The Merger Control Regulation of
the European Economic Community, 38 AM. J. Con. L. 923 (1990).
29. Council Directive 78/660 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Annual Accounts
of Certain Types of Companies, 21 O.J. EUR. CoM. (No. L 222) 11 (1978), 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1371; Council Directive 82/891 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of The Treaty, Concerning the
Division of Public Limited Liability Companies, 25 O.J. EuR. CoMm. (No. L 378) 47 (1982), 1
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1411; Council Directive 83/349 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty
on Consolidated Accounts, 26 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 193), 1 (1983), 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1421.
30. Council Directive 84/253 Based on Article 54(3)(g) of the Treaty on the Approval of
Persons Responsible for Carrying out the Statutory Audits of Accounting Documents, 27 O.J. EuR.
Col. (No. L. 126) 20 (1984), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1431.
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tives governing admission to stock exchanges,3 disclosures upon exchange
listing,32 interim reporting requirements,33 prospectuses, 34 and mutual funds.3"
Together with the Insider Trading Directive and a proposed investment services
directive,36 these directives, as finally implemented by the member states, will
form a supranational European securities code. This evolving regime represents
a significant advance for both regulatory harmony and higher regulatory stan-
dards among the member states. 37
This article will focus first on the legislative background of the Insider
Trading Directive, from its origins in the European Code of Conduct38 to the
several drafts from which it emerged. Then the doctrinal basis underlying the
directive's adoption will be examined, for the dual purposes of understanding
the EC's policy objectives and of developing an interpretive framework. After
discussing the directive's legislative development, the article will provide a de-
tailed analysis of the directive's substantive prohibitions on trading and tipping,
with particular emphasis on the definitions of "inside information" and "pri-
mary" and "secondary insiders." The analysis also will focus on the other ele-
ments of, as well as the various exclusions from, the trading and tipping offenses.
Then, the issues of penalties, enforcement and multistate cooperation will be
addressed. Finally, the article will reiterate the primary strengths of the direc-
tive, as well as its deficiencies, as the EC continues its quest for a harmonized
securities regime for the common market.
II. TiB LEGsLATIV- BACKGROUND
The development of the Insider Trading Directive began almost fifteen years
ago in 1976 when the Commission of the European Communities (Commis-
31. Council Directive 79/279 Coordinating the Conditions for the Admission of Securities to
Official Stock Exchange Listing, 22 O.J. Eun. Comm. (No. L 66) 21 (1979), 1 Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH) 1721, amended by Council Directive 82/148, 25 O.J. Eu. Comm. (No. L 62) 22 (1982)
[hereinafter Admission Directive].
32. Council Directive 80/390 Co-ordinating the Requirements for the Drawing Up, Scrutiny
and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to be Published for the Admission of Securities to Official
Stock Exchange Listing, 23 O.J. EuR. Comm f. (No. L 100) 1 (1980), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
1731.
33. Council Directive 82/121 on Information to be Published on a Regular Basis by Compa-
nies the Shares of Which Have Been Admitted to Official Stock-Exchange Listing, 25 O.J. EuR.
Comm. (No. L 48) 26 (1982), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1741.
34. Council Directive 89/298 Co-ordinating the Requirements for the Drawing-up, Scrutiny
and Distribution of the Prospectus to be Published when Transferrable Securities are Offered to the
Public, 32 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 124/8) 8 (1989), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1751. See
generally Warren, The Common Market Prospectus, 26 CommoN Micr. L. Ray. 687 (1989).
35. Council Directive 85/611 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS),
28 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 375) 3 (1985), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1486.18, amended by
Council Directive 88/220, 31 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. L 100) 31 (1988).
36. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities
Field, 32 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 43) 7 (1989), 1 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) '95028.
37. See Warren, supra note 25, at 224-26.
38. Commission Recommendation 77/534 Concerning a European Code of Conduct Relating
to Transactions in Transferable Securities, 20 O.J. Etur. Comm. (No. L 212) 37 (1977), 1 Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1602.33 [hereinafter European Code of Conduct].
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sion)39 formed a working party of experts to consider a common insider trading
prohibition for adoption by the member states.4 The following year, the Com-
mission, asserting but, in fact, acting without the consensus of the member
states, issued a formal recommendation entitled the "Commission Recommen-
dation Concerning a European Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in
Transferable Securities" (European Code of Conduct). 41 It set forth the follow-
ing as one of six general principles: "Any person, who by virtue of his profes-
sion or duties has the duty or the means of informing the public, is under a
special obligation to ensure that it is kept properly informed, and that no par-
ticular class of persons attains a privileged position. ' 42 The European Code of
Conduct, through a number of supplementary principles, advanced the Com-
mission's ethic that insider trading should be prohibited by the member states.
43
The principle which would serve as a precursor to the directive's prohibition
provided:
Any person who comes into possession of information, in exercising
his profession or carrying out his duties, which is not public and which
relates to a company or to the market in its securities or to any event
of general interest to the market, which is price-sensitive, should refrain
from carrying out, directly or indirectly, any transaction in which such
information is used, and should refrain from giving the information to
another person so that he may profit from it before the information
becomes public. 44
Although clearly a blueprint for future securities regulation by the EC,
the European Code of Conduct had little immediate impact on either the
laws of various member states or the working party previously established.
The Commission's formulation of business ethics, as set forth in the
European Code of Conduct, "received a lukewarm reception when it was
presented and is still relatively unknown to this day, even among ex-
39. The Commission is composed of 17 members, appointed by mutual agreement among the
governments of the member states. At least one national from each member state must be included,
but no more than two may be of the same nationality. The Commission's most important function
is to see that provisions of the Treaty are implemented. It has the power of initiative under the
Treaty of Rome, thereby playing a prominent role in the shaping of measures taken by the Council
and the Parliament. The composition, duties, and function of the Commission are governed by the
Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 255-263. 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472.01 - .07. See
generally C. TUGEND-AT, MAKING SENSE OF EUROPE (1988).
40. See Cruickshank, Insider Trading in the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345, 346 (1982).
41. European Code of Conduct, supra note 38. It is of interest to note that in the preamble
to the European Code of Conduct, the Commission recited that the basic principles contained therein
were "already widely recognized in all the countries of Europe." Id. But compare the preamble to
the Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, which recognizes that some member states have "no
rules or regulations prohibiting insider dealing." Therefore, one must conclude that the Commission,
in its recommended European Code of Conduct, was experiencing not reality but its hopes and
dreams.
42. European Code of Conduct, supra note 38, at 41.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 42.
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perts. ' ' 41 Nevertheless, the language of the Code's prohibition, with its
marked similarity to the ultimate EC prohibitions on trading and tipping
while in possession of nonpublic "market information," served as an
important starting point.
The Commission, after over a decade of deliberation by the working
party on numerous drafts, first proposed its insider trading directive on
May 25, 1987 (First Proposal).46 It did so despite the continual opposition
of the Germans, who, preferring their own voluntary and toothless guide-
lines, were opposed to any legally binding harmonization in this area.
47
Pursuant to the EC's cooperation procedure4" for the adoption of direc-
45. BuXBAuM & HoPT, supra note 5, at 231.
46. First Proposal, supra note 14.
47. See BUXnAUM & Hosr, supra note 5, at 247; Hopt, European Directive, supra note 3,
at 56; see generally Hopt, German Guidelines, supra note 3.
48. The EC's cooperation procedure was introduced by the Single European Act, supra
note 2, and provides the framework for the cooperative enactment of EC laws by the Commis-
sion, which initiates proposals; the European Parliament, which has a consultative role; and the
Council of Ministers, which makes the final decisions. The Act states:
Where, in pursuance of this Treaty, the Council acts in co-operation with the Euro-
pean Parliament, the following procedure shall apply:
(a) The Council, acting by a qualified majority under the conditions of para-
graph 1, on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the Opinion of the
European Parliament, shall adopt a common position.
(b) The Council's common position shall be communicated to the European Par- -
liament. The Council and the Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully
of the reasons which led the Council to adopt its common position and also of the
Commission's position.
If, within three months of such communication, the European Parliament ap-
proves this common position or has not taken a decision within that period, the Coun-
cil shall definitively adopt the act in question in accordance with the common position.
(c) The European Parliament may within the period of three months referred to
in point (b), by an absolute majority of its component members, propose amendments
to the Council's common position. The European Parliament may also, by the same
majority, reject the Council's common position. The result of the proceedings shall
be transmitted to the Council and the Commission.
If the European Parliament has rejected the Council's common position, una-
nimity shall be required for the Council to act on a second reading.
(d) The Commission shall, within a period of one month, re-examine the pro-
posal on the basis of which the Council adopted its common position, by taking into
account the amendments proposed by the European Parliament.
The Commission shall forward to the Council, at the same time as its re-exam-
ined proposal, the amendments of the European Parliament which it has not accepted,
and shall express its opinion on them. The Council may adopt these amendments
unanimously.
(e) The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt the proposal as re-
examined by the Commission.
Unanimity shall be required for the Council to amend the proposal as re-exam-
ined by the Commission.
(f) In the cases referred to in points (c), (d) and (e), the Council shall be required
to act within a period of three months. If no decision is taken within this period, the
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tives, the Commission presented the First Proposal to the EC's Council
Commission proposal shall be deemed not to have been adopted.
(g) The periods referred to in points (b) and (f) may be extended by a maximum
of one month by common accord between the Council and the European Parliament.
Id. art. 7.
The EC Delegation to the United States recently published the following chart illustrating
the cooperation procedure:







Approval or Amendment by

























EC Delegation to the U.S., A Guide to the European Community
7 (1990).
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of Ministers.4 9 The Council in turn forwarded the First Proposal to the
European Parliament 0 for an opinion (Parliamentary Opinion).51 The
European Parliament, on the basis of the Hoon Report 2 drawn up by its
Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, proposed a number of
substantive amendments which would have greatly strengthened the insider
trading prohibition. Among the various amendments proposed in the
Parliamentary Opinion were provisions adding "employees" to the class
of restrained insiders, 3 increasing the scope of the directive to include
off-market transactions, 54 providing a broad definition of nonpublic in-
formation,5 5 requiring that competent authorities56 be given investigatory
powers,5 7 demanding the harmonization of penalties5 8 and imposing civil
remedies, including the indemnification of losses to private parties. 9 The
49. The Council has perhaps the most important role in the attainment of the objectives
of the Treaty of Rome. The principal elements of that role are: (I) The responsibility to ensure
the coordination of the economic policies of the Member States; (2) the power to make the
final decision on all acts undertaken under the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, although
most decisions require a prior proposal of the Commission and often consultation with the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee; and (3) the requirement that
the Council confer certain powers on the Commission necessary for implementation of the
Council's rules. Each Member State government delegates a representative in the Council, who
must be a member of the government. The Council is governed by the Treaty of Rome, supra
note I, arts. 145-154. 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4402.01 -.07, 4406.03 (1989).
50. The people of the Member States directly elect their representatives to the European
Parliament, which currently has 518 members. Unlike the traditional parliamentary function,
the European Parliament has no legislative power; its main role is to give advisory opinions
on the European Commission's proposed legislation. The European Parliament is governed by
the Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, arts. 137-144. 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4302.01 -
.07 (1989). See generally F. JAcoBs & R. CORBETr, THE EuxoPE" PARLIAMNT (1990).
51. European Parliament Opinion on Proposal from the Commission to the Council for
a Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading, 31 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 187)
90 (1988) [hereinafter Parliamentary Opinion].
52. Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights Proposed Amendment to the
Proposal from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Directive
Coordinating Regulations on Insider Trading, Eut. PAu. Sass. Docs., ser. A, Doc. A2-055/
88 (May 5, 1988) [hereinafter Hoon Report].
53. Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 51, at 91.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 92.
56. Id. Article 8 of the Insider Trading Directive provides:
1. [Enforcement authorities to be designated] Each Member State shall designate the
administrative authority or authorities competent, if necessary in collaboration with
other authorities to ensure that the provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive are
applied. It shall so inform the Commission which shall transmit that information to
all Member States.
2. [Authorities to be given adequate powers] The competent authorities must be
given all supervisory and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of
their functions, where appropriate in collaboration with other authorities.
Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 8.
57. Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 51, at 92.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 93.
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only specific recommendation of the Hoon Report rejected by the Euro-
pean Parliament was that a violation of the directive's prohibition on
insider trading would constitute both a breach of the criminal law and the
basis for appropriate civil remedies in all member states.60 The European
Parliament, instead of prescribing the nature or severity of penalties,
included in its opinion a mandate that the Commission advance proposals
for harmonized penalties. 61 The European Parliament clearly believed that
harmonization of rules, but not sanctions, would exalt form more than
substance.
The European Parliament also suggested a significant change in the
legal basis for the directive under the Treaty of Rome. The preamble to
the First Proposal referred to Article 54(3)(g)62 as the treaty basis for the
directive.63 This provision, in furtherance of the Treaty of Rome's "freedom
of establishment, '" 64 requires the Council to harmonize member state laws
pertaining to the protection of investors in member state firms.65 The
Parliamentary Opinion recommended replacing Article 54(3)(g)6 with Article
100a, 67 a provision added to the Treaty of Rome by the Single European
Act in 1986.68 Article 100a requires the Council to adopt harmonizing
measures "which have as their object the establishment and functioning of
the internal market.' '69 Whereas Article 54(3)(g) is directed to harmonized
standards of fair behavior toward investors and creditors of member state
firms, Article 100a, as applied here, is directed to the establishment and
smooth functioning of the EC's unified securities markets. One commen-
tator, agreeing that Article 100a provides an appropriate legal basis for this
and other securities law directives,70 has suggested that the change in legal
basis could have a significant influence on the future interpretation of the
Insider Trading Directive.7 1 The European Parliament's proposed modifi-
cation of the directive's treaty basis was adopted by the Council and included
in the preamble of the Insider Trading Directive.72 Unfortunately, certain
of the other proposed changes advanced by the European Parliament did
not enjoy similar success.
The Commission, after considering the Parliamentary Opinion, submit-
ted an amended proposal to the Council on October 4, 1988 (Amended
60. Hoon Report, supra note 52, at 10.
61. Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 51, at 92.
62. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 54(3)(g).
63. First Proposal, supra note 14, preamble.
64. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 54(3)(g).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 51, at 90.
68. Single European Act, supra note 2, art. 18.
69. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 100a.
70. Fornasier, The Directive on Insider Dealing, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 149, 160 (1989-
90).
71. Id. at 156.
72. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
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Proposal).7 3 In the Amended Proposal, the Commission agreed to most of
the changes recommended in the Parliamentary Opinion. Consequently, the
prohibitory scheme became considerably stronger than that set forth in the
First Proposal. The Commission failed, however, to accept and propose
several of the European Parliament's more significant revisions. The Amended
Proposal included part of the suggested broadening of the nonpublic infor-
mation definition but did not include the criterion that information, to be
characterized as public, must be effectively disclosed to the investing public.
74
The Commission, in a tragic misstep, failed to accept the parliamentary
proposals pertaining to harmonization of penalties and civil remedies for
violation of the directive.7 5 Instead, the Commission, without any reference
to criminal or civil remedies, added a requirement that the penalties required
to be adopted by the member states must be "sufficiently dissuasive to
ensure respect" for the insider trading laws enacted by the member states
pursuant to the directive. 76 Moreover, the Commission added three new
provisions in its Amended Proposal further diluting the scope of the
directive. These included an exclusion from liability for legal, as opposed
to natural persons,77 an exemption for government securities, 78 and a re-
striction on a member state's application of the tipping prohibition to
residents on the territory of the member state.79 Thus, the Commission
forwarded a watered down directive to the Council. The dilution would
continue.
At this juncture in the legislative development of the directive, the
financial services industry in the United Kingdom and elsewhere in the EC
mobilized, finally convinced that the Commission would soon succeed in
its effort to prohibit insider trading in the common market. During the
roughly nine-month period between the Commission's presentation of the
Amended Proposal and the Council's adoption of its "Common Position"8 0
on July 17, 1989, numerous compromises were reached, virtually all of
which weakened the regulatory force of the final product. The British,
although not alone, virtually rewrote the directive to satisfy their objections.
Vaingloriously, they even added their signature to the front page of the
final version, changing the phrase, "insider trading," in the directive's title,
to "insider dealing," the synonymous phrase in British legal terminology.'
73. Commission Amendment to the Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating
Regulations on Insider Trading, 31 O.J. EuR. Comm. (No. C 277) 13 (1988) [hereinafter
Amended Proposal].
74. Id. art. 6.
75. Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 51, at 92-93.
76. Amended Proposal, supra note 73, art. 11.
77. Id. art. 1(2).
78. Id. art. 1(4).
79. Id. art. 3(2).
80. Council Common Position Adopted with a View to the Adoption of a Council
Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, EuR. PARL. SEss. Docs., ser. C, Doe.
C3-0018/89 (July 28, 1989) [hereinafter Common Position].
81. Id. See supra note 8. T
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The compromises begin in the preamble with the addition of four
paragraphs to reduce or eliminate liability for broker-dealers,82 market
makers,83 analysts84 and those complying with governmental requests for
information.8 5 The prohibition on primary and secondary insiders against
taking advantage of inside information was qualified by an added require-
ment that the action be taken "with full knowledge of the facts. '"86 The
antitipping provision set forth in the Amended Proposal was narrowed to
exclude tippees and other secondary insiders.8 7 In defining "inside infor-
mation," the "material effect on the price" criterion was deleted in favor
of the phrase "significant effect on the price. '"88 The mandate of cooperation
among the member states' competent authorities was modified by providing
several grounds for a member state's refusal to respond to official requests
for information. 9 Finally, while penalties were left to the discretion of
member states, the phrase, "shall be sufficiently dissuasive to ensure re-
spect," was replaced by the less forceful phrase, "sufficient to promote
compliance.'"'9 Although other substantive changes were made, including a
comprehensive restructuring of the directive, these represent the more im-
portant revisions adopted by the Council. The Council then forwarded its
Common Position to the European Parliament pursuant to the cooperation
procedure. 91
The European Parliament, in a last gasp effort, again sought to strengthen
the directive. On October 11, 1989, it proposed two substantive amend-
ments.92 The first would have reimposed the directive's antitipping prohi-
bition on secondary, as well as primary insiders. 93 The second proposal of




86. Id. arts. 2(1), 4.
87. Id. art. 4. For the definitional distinction between primary and secondary insiders
established by the Insider Trading Directive, see infra notes 180-196 and accompanying text.
88. Common Position, supra note 80, art. I(1).
89. Id. art. 10(2). Article 10(2) of the Common Position provides that competent
authorities "may refuse to act on a request for information": (a) where compliance "might
adversely affect the sovereignty, security or public policy" of the requested member state, or
(b) where the matter is being or has been prosecuted in the courts of the requested member
state. Id. The final version of the directive, reflecting the Common Position, also provides for
the "professional secrecy" of all information obtained by any competent authority, whether
generated by its own efforts or obtained from the competent authorities of other member
states. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, arts. 9 and 10(1). Moreover, absent the consent
of the requested state, a requesting member state may use the information obtained from
another member state only in connection with the insider trading investigation and not for
other regulatory purposes. Id. art. 10(3).
90. Id. art. 13.
91. See supra note 48.
92. European Parliament Opinion on the Common Position of the Council with a View
to the Adoption of a Directive Coordinating Regulations on Insider Dealing, 32 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. C 291) 54 (1989) [hereinafter Second Parliamentary Opinion].
93. Id. at 54.
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the European Parliament would have extended the applicability of a member
state's trading and tipping prohibitions not only to "actions" occurring
within its territory but also to its "residents" whose actions take place
elsewhere. 94 Both changes were rejected by the Council, which adopted the
directive without further discussion on November 13, 1989. 91 The Council,
in the penultimate article of the directive, gave the member states a June
1, 1992 deadline to enact national legislation in conformity with its prohi-
bitions.
9 6
The tortuous legislative development of the directive, which will be
refined further in the ensuing analysis of the directive's prohibitions, is
crucial to any comprehensive understanding of the directive's scope and
effect. Because of the wide margin of discretion given to the member states,
as well as the Council's ambivalent position both on the criminality of the
prohibited conduct and the penalties to be imposed, the new European sin
may be transformed into twelve moral fragments, indeterminate and dis-
harmonious.
III. THE DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR THE DIRECTIVE
The Insider Trading Directive imposes three substantive rules: A pro-
hibition against trading applicable to both primary insiders97 and secondary
insiders; 98 a prohibition on tipping applicable to primary insiders, but not
94. The First Proposal's trading rule provided that when a prohibited transaction is
executed on a stock exchange market, the directive-based insider trading laws of the member
state where that stock exchange is located are applicable. First Proposal, supra note 14, art.
I. When not executed on an exchange market, laws of the member state where the non-insider
opposite trader is a resident are applicable. Id. The First Proposal's tipping rule provided for
applicability of the law of the member state where the insider is a resident. Id. art. 2. These
territorial scope provisions were harshly criticized by the British as too restrictive. See, e.g.,
THE LAW SOCIETY'S STANDING COMMITTEE ON COMPANY LAW, MEMORANDUM ON THE PROPOSAL
FOR A DIRECTIVE COORDINATING REGULATIONS ON INSIDER TRADING 4-7 (1987). The Insider
Trading Directive looks to the place where the wrongful actions occurred rather than to the
place of the wrongdoer's domicile.
The directive, as adopted, provides as follows:
Each Member State shall apply the prohibitions provided for in Articles 2, 3, and
4 [the trading and tipping rules], at least to actions undertaken within its territory
to the extent that the transferable securities concerned are admitted to trading on a
market of a Member State. In any event, each Member State shall regard a transaction
as carried out within its territory if it is carried out on a market, as defined in
Article 1(2) infine [any regulated market], situated or operating within that territory.
Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 5.
The Council, in adopting this language, rejected the suggestion made by the European
Parliament that a member state's trading and tipping rules also be extended to its residents
regardless of where the actions take place. Although each member state may extend the
application of its law to residents, the directive does not require that extension.
95. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3.
96. Id. art. 14.
97. Id. art. 2.
98. Id. art. 4. See infra notes 180-196 and accompanying text.
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to tippees and other secondary insiders; 99 and a mandatory current disclosure
requirement applicable to firms whose securities are publicly traded in any
regulated market.'00 Each of these rules finds its source in the EC's philos-
ophy of disclosure in the regulation of the securities markets of the member
states.' 0' This regulatory philosophy has been amply demonstrated in both
the corporate and securities law directives previously adopted.'02 The Com-
mission's doctrinal foundation for the EC's insider trading rules is outlined
in the recitals to the directive. 103 A synthesis of those recitals reveals two
fundamental objectives: Enhanced harmonization and improved market
function.
Harmonization, of course, is the basic game plan of the EC's 1992
program under the Treaty of Rome. The Treaty basis for the directive,
Article 100a, mandates "approximation" of member states' laws,' °4 and the
recitals in the directive repeatedly refer to the necessity of "coordinated
rules" among the member states. 105 Harmonization, by definition, is intended
to reduce inconsistencies among the various regulatory schemes that enable
abusive behavior. The harmonization sought through the Insider Trading
Directive actually serves not only to develop a degree of regulatory parity,
but also to "level up" pre-existing national regulatory schemes to the
directive's common denominator.'0 6 For three-fourths of the member states,
harmonization meant the regulation of conduct to which governmental
authorities had remained indifferent. In this context, harmonization truly
legislates. Under the directive's command, harmonization becomes a back-
hoe, leveling the regulatory fields of the member states and leveling the
playing fields for EC investors. When the leveling is done, the recitals
claim, the function of the securities markets will be enhanced.
The improved market function objective is certainly more directly critical
to the directive's substantive prohibitions than the harmonization objective.
After all, the EC Commission could have harmonized to a common denom-
inator considerably less comprehensive than the directive and much closer
to the pre-existing regulatory vacuum found in most of the member states.
99. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 3.
100. Id. art. 7. It should be noted that application of the Insider Trading Directive's
current disclosure rule, as a result of its reference to Article 1(2), is not expressly limited to
issuers with securities listed on the exchanges of the member states, while, under Article 5,
the trading and tipping rules are limited to transactions on a market situated in a member
state's territory. See supra note 94. Given the directive's policy focus on the improved function
of the EC's securities markets, member states are likely to limit application of their current
disclosure rules to issuers domiciled inside or outside the common market that have securities
listed on markets located solely in the member states. See infra notes 130-135 and accompanying
text.
101. See Warren, supra note 25, at 209. See also Cruickshank, supra note 40, at 347.
102. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.]
103. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
104. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 100a.
105. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
106. See Warren, Euroequity Offerings, supra note 10, at 24.
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A quantitative deconstruction of the directive's recitals finds two normative
references to the equality of opportunity, or fair play value, three references
to investor confidence and five references to improved market function.'
°7
These references attempt, collectively, to establish a linkage between inves-
tors being placed on an "equal footing" vis a vis other investors 08 (fair
play),' 9 the enhancement of investors' confidence in the EC's securities
markets," 0 and the positive impact of that confidence, presumably contrib-
uting to increased market depth and liquidity, on the "smooth functioning"
or efficiency of those securities markets."' Consequently, the policy argu-
ment runs, the two mandates of Article 100a, the harmonization of national
laws and the establishment and functioning of the internal market, will be
fulfilled. Although this linkage might be viewed as feeble casuistry, it
provides a useful guide to the intent and purposes of the directive.
The linkage between fair play, enhanced confidence, and improved
market function does not appear to have been intensely analyzed by the
drafters of the directive. Apparently, the linkage was intuitively self-evident
to the Commission. In its explanatory memorandum accompanying the First
Proposal, the Commission makes no reference to any anecdotal or empirical
data supporting its assumptions." 2 Neither the literature written thus far
nor interviews by the author with various parties involved in the drafting
of the directive indicate any consideration by the Commission of the intense
theoretical debate among academics and others regarding the value of insider
trading regulation." 3 Obviously, "free market" arguments that insider trad-
ing is a victimless crime,' 4 or a beneficial incentive compensation scheme
for risk-averse management," 5 or an important contributor to more efficient
107. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
108. Id.
109. See Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lOb-5, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 801, 805-09 (1980).
110. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
111. Id.
112. First Proposal, supra note 14, explanatory memorandum.
113. The relative merits of insider trading regulation have been the subject of intense
debate in the United States. See infra notes 114-119 and accompanying text. That debate has
focused extensively on the improved market function rationale that guided the EC in formu-
lating the Insider Trading Directive under the Treaty of Rome. Commonly referred to. as the
"integrity of the market theory," this policy favoring regulation has been summarized as
follows:
The primary policy reason for proscribing trading while in possession of material
nonpublic information is to make investors confident that they can trade securities
without being subject to informational disadvantages. The goal is to guarantee the
integrity of the market.
Seligman, The Reformulation of Federal Securities Law Concerning Nonpublic Information,
73 GEo. L.J. 1083, 1115 (1985).
114. See, e.g., Carney, Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U.L. RV.
863, 890-91 (1987).
115. See, e.g., H. MANaN, INSIDER TRADIN AND TM STOCK MARKET 138-43 (1966);
Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 861-66 (1983).
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pricing of securities," 6 held little sway for the Commission. Conversely, no
consideration appears to have been given to the rejoinder that insider trading
is a misappropriation of property rights, 17 or a self-determined random
compensation package with high monitoring costs,"' or, most importantly,
an inducement to the moral hazard of selective disclosure and disinformation
schemes." 9 The Commission, in effect, has agreed with the conclusion of
the American Bar Association study that "a widespread fear of pervasive
unfairness to investors [has] a potentially corrosive impact on the securities
markets. "120 Perhaps, in reaching its conclusion, the EC had become cog-
nizant of the "potentially corrosive impact" on politicians that accompanied
several highly publicized insider trading scandals in Great Britain and
France.' 2 1 What may have mattered to the EC drafters, as aptly stated by
an Economist essay, "is the gut instincts of millions of ordinary people
whose savings fuel the markets and whose votes can turf out of office
politicians who favour free markets" and oppose regulation.'2 Whether the
various member states' legislatures and enforcement authorities concur with
the EC conclusion remains to be seen, especially given their regulatory and
business traditions.
The daisy chain of linear conclusions supporting the market function
objective, while admittedly simplistic, deserves a closer look. The switch in
treaty basis from Article 54(3)(g) to Article 100a of the Treaty of Rome'2
establishes a well-spring for interpreting the intent and, hence, the contours
of the directive's prohibitions. Article 54(3)(g) is oriented to the open-ended
morass of investor protection and to various notions of fraud and fiduciary
obligations imposed on corporate management.' 24 Article 100a, however, is
116. See, e.g., MANNE, supra note 115, at 78-104; Fischel, Insider Trading and Investment
Analysts: An Economic Analysis of Dirks v. Securities Exchange Commission, 13 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 127, 133 (1984). But see Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 629-34 (1984).
117. See, e.g., Macey, From Fairness to Contract: The New Direction of the Rules Against
Insider Trading, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 9, 39-47 (1984).
118. See, e.g., Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and
the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 309, 332.
119. See, e.g., Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the "Chicago
School," 1986 DuKE L. J. 628, 636-37, 643; Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on
the Internal Efficiency of Large Corporations, 80 MIcH. L. REv. 1051, 1051-1064 (1982);
Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market,
53 VA. L. REv. 1425, 1448-50 (1967); Scott, supra note 109 at 815-816; Seligman, supra note
113, at 1095; Warren, A Foreword on Insider Trading Regulation, 39 A.A. L. REv. 337, 346-
47 (1988).
120. ABA Comm. on Fed. Regulation of Sec., Report on the Task Force on Regulation
of Insider Trading, Part I: Regulation Under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 41 Bus. LAw. 223, 225 (1985).
121. See supra note 19.
122. Insider Trading, ECONOMIST, Nov. 22, 1986, at 15.
123. See supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
124. Treaty of Rome, supra note 1, art. 54(3)(g). Article 54(3)(g) provides:
3. The Council and the Commission shall carry out the duties devolving upon them
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oriented not to the breach of duties by management or individual market
participants, but rather to the overall efficiency of the marketplace. 25 While
not contradictory to and, indeed, supportive of investor protection concerns,
this approach avoids the plague of difficulties that has devastated insider
trading jurisprudence in the United States. 26 Freed from the restraints of
under the preceding provisions, in particular:
g) by coordinating to the necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection
of the interests of members and others, are required by Member States of companies
or firms within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58 with a view to
making such safeguards equivalent throughout the Community.
125. Id. art. 100a. Article 100a states:
By way of derogation from Article 100 and save where otherwise provided in this
Treaty, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives
set out in Article 8a. The Council shall, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal
from the Commission in cooperation with the European Parliament and after
consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approx-
imation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in
Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market.
126. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain in depth the failure of insider trading
jurisprudence in the United States. In large measure, the failure is due to the absence of any
specific rule of law defining insider trading. See infra note 141 and accompanying text. The
SEC, instead of seeking a statutory or regulatory prohibition, decided to build the insider
trading "house of cards" on rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), a broad, nonspecific
antifraud rule "virtually as vague as the Due Process Clause." L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SEcuRm~s REGULATION 728 (2d ed. 1988). Taking a rather creative view, the SEC fashioned
from rule lob-5 an affirmative duty to disclose nonpublic information before trading the
securities to which that information relates. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
Although followed by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the affirmative disclosure duty
created by the SEC did not survive Supreme Court scrutiny. In Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Court turned to state law notions of fiduciary duty to determine
whether some element of deception or manipulation might be present to justify invoking rule
lob-5. Because the trader had no fiduciary duty to disclose the nonpublic information to
shareholders of the corporation whose securities he traded, rule lob-5 could not be applied.
See generally Langevoort, Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Principle: A Post-Chiarella
Restatement, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982). Similarly, in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), the
Supreme Court extended its fraud-fiduciary duty analysis to a tippee, requiring a breach of
duty by the insider divulging the information as a prerequisite to the "derivative duty" of the
tippee. To circumvent the Court's restrictive, but understandable, view of rule lOb-5, the SEC
promulgated rule 14e-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (1990), to prohibit insider trading in connection
with takeovers. The SEC's authority to do so has been seriously challenged by the Second
Circuit in United States v. Chestman, 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1990), now awaiting an en banc
decision. See Lambert, Court to Review Insider-Trade Case that was Reversed, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 28, 1990, at B4, col. 3. In other cases, the SEC has resorted to the so-called "misap-
propriation theory," which holds that a trader who steals nonpublic information or obtains it
through a breach of duty under tort or contract law is subject to prosecution under rule lOb-
5. In United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), the
Supreme Court sidestepped the SEC's misappropriation theory as adopted by the Second
Circuit. No one knows where rule lOb-5 will take us next in the SEC's struggle with insider
trading and the vagaries of fraud-related duties to disclose. See generally, Warren, Who's
Suing Who? A Commentary on Investment Bankers and the Misappropriation Theory, 46 MD.
L. REv. 1222 (1987).
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vague fiduciary duty and fraud concepts, the directive's daisy chain becomes
curvilinear, with Article 100a as its clasp, closing the circle around the
unified securities market as a whole, without any need to address the injuries
to individual investors or firms resulting from fraud or other tortious
conduct. Thus, through its prohibitions, the directive is able to circumvent
tedious distinctions between insiders and outsiders, inside information and
market information, the immoral tipper and the derivative tippee, all based
on the fraud and fiduciary duty rubric which led to the collapse of the
United States Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Rule lOb-5 27 as
applied to insider trading of securities.' 28 By eliminating the forced use of
criteria underlying fraud, deception and related fiduciary duty notions, 29
the EC has produced a directive which has greater potential effectiveness
on its face than the evolving insider trading prohibitions in the United
States. The market function objective, as the primary basis underlying the
EC's insider trading directive, should prove a beneficial guide to the
interpretation of the directive's substantive rules.
IV. THE ELEMENTS OF THE TRADING AND TrPPING RuLs
Any comprehensive understanding of the three substantive rules imposed
by the EC's Insider Trading Directive obviously is dependent on a thoughtful
analysis of their respective elements. Of the three rules, the current disclosure
rule, 130 which simply expands the scope of application under the EC's
Admission Directive, is the least far-reaching. The EC's Admission Direc-
tive,' 3' adopted in 1979, established a timely disclosure duty not for insiders,
but for the issuers of all securities listed on the stock exchanges of the
member states. The Admission Directive imposed a continuing obligation
on all companies with shares officially listed on any member state's stock
exchange to
127. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or by the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the state made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
128. See supra note 126.
129. Other commentators agree that the directive's prohibitions are solely statutory and,
consequently, operate free from the constraints of the law of torts. See, e.g., Hopt, supra
note 47, at 64; Note, Toward Unification, supra note 8, at 450; Note, Securities-Insider
Trading-The Effects of the New EEC Draft Insider Trading Directive, 18 GA. J. INT'L &
COmp. L. 119, 134-35 (1988); Note, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 3, at 240-41.
130. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 7.
131. Supra note 31.
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inform the public as soon as possible of any major new develop-
ments in its sphere of activity which are not public knowledge and
which may, by virtue of their effect on its assets and liabilities or
financial position or on the general course of its business, lead to
substantial movements in the prices of its shares.
132
The Insider Trading Directive's current disclosure rule extends this obligation
to all companies whose securities are admitted to trading on any regulated
market, wherever located. 33 The current disclosure rule is subject to the
Admission Directive's escape hatch, which permits companies to seek a
disclosure exemption from competent authorities where that disclosure would
prejudice the company's "legitimate interests.'
'3 4
The directive's current disclosure rule does not work a major change in
the existing laws of the member states and, consequently, has not been
particularly controversial.1 35 The two other rules, the prohibitions against
insider trading and tipping, are intended to accomplish radical change for
most of the member states. These prohibitions are the core rules of the
Insider Trading Directive and represent the genesis of the EC's supranational
insider trading regime.
The insider trading rule prohibits an insider, one who possesses "inside
information," "from taking advantage of that information with full knowl-
edge of the facts by acquiring or disposing of for his own account or for
the account of a third party, either directly or indirectly, transferable
securities of the issuer or issuers to which that information relates.' 36 The
trading rule incorporates four elements: (1) Possession of inside information,
(2) by an insider, (3) who takes advantage of that information by trading,
(4) while having full knowledge of the facts. The directive distinguishes two
categories of insiders: Primary insiders and secondary insiders. Primary
insiders are persons who possess inside information as a consequence of
their employment or other direct positional access to that information. 137
Secondary insiders are persons other than primary insiders who possess
inside information, "the direct or indirect source of which could not be
other than a [primary insiderl. ' "'3 8 The trading rule applies to both categories
of insiders, but the tipping rule does not.
The directive's tipping rule prohibits primary insiders from "disclosing
... inside information to any third party unless such disclosure is made in
the normal course of the exercise of his employment, profession or du-
ties."' 3 9 In addition, the tipping rule prohibits primary insiders from "rec-
132. Admission Directive, supra note 31, schedule C(5)(a).
133. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 7. See supra note 100.
134. Admission Directive, supra note 31, schedule C(5)(a).
135. See, e.g., Note, A New Look, supra note 3, at 150.
136. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(1).
137. Id.
138. Id. art. 4.
139. Id. art. 3(a).
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ommending or procuring a third party, on the basis of that inside information,
to acquire or dispose of transferable securities."' 14 Although the tipping
rule does not apply to secondary insiders, the trading and tipping prohibi-
tions both depend on the possession of "inside information" by "insiders"
and, thus share certain common elements. After an analysis of the four
common elements of the trading rule, two of which are shared with the
tipping rule, the article will address the additional elements of the trading
rule as applied to secondary insiders and of the tipping rule applicable only
to primary insiders.
A. Inside Information
The directive commences its development of the prohibitions by use of
a technique that the SEC has avoided both to its peril and to the peril of
investors generally: 4 ' The use of a statutory definition of the key concept,
"inside information.' '1 42 The EC defines the term as having four essential
characteristics:
(1) information which has not been made public (nonpublic);
(2) of a precise nature (precise);
(3) relating to one or several issuers of transferable securities 43 or
to one or several transferable securities (market information);
(4) which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a
significant effect on the price of the securities (price sensitive).'"
Each of these characteristics is the product of compromise during the
drafting process and should be separately addressed in order to appreciate
the EC's concept of inside information.
1. Nonpublic Information
The first of these characteristics of inside information, "information
which has not been made public," forms an integral part of the directive's
140. Id. art. 3(b).
141. The SEC has consistently refused to seek a statutory or regulatory definition of
inside information. See Symposium: Defining Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REv. 337-558 (1988).
See generally Ricks, GAO Concludes Insider Trading Needs Definition, Wall St. J., Sept. 26,
1988, at 37, col. 1.
142. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
143. The term "transferable securities" is defined in article 1(2) as:
(a) shares and debt securities, as well as securities equivalent to shares and debt
securities;
(b) contracts or rights to subscribe for, acquire or dispose of securities referred to
in (a);
(c) future contracts, options and financial futures in respect of securities referred to
in (a);
(d) index contracts in respect of securities referred to in (a);
when admitted to trading on a market which is regulated and supervised by authorities
recognized by public bodies, operates regularly and is accessible directly or indirectly
to the public.
144. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
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goal to put investors on an "equal footing."' 45 In aiming for a reduction
of trading benefits for those who profit from informational asymmetries,
the directive works a revival of the SEC's "parity of information" ap-
proach.' 46 That approach, which was the predicate for the In re Cady,
Roberts & Co.' 47 "disclose or abstain" from trading rule, was rejected by
the United States Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States.148 Although
the Chiarella Court entangled itself in the duty to disclose analysis arising
from fraud and related fiduciary duty theories, the EC, as noted previously,
has avoided this analytical trap in fashioning its own insider trading rules.
The SEC's old "disclose or abstain" rule conceivably could enjoy a renais-
sance in the common market. The coverage of the rule, of course, depends
to a great extent on how restrictively the phrase "has not been made public"
is interpreted.
The directive itself provides little guidance in determining the breadth
of the phrase. The European Parliament accepted the Hoon Report rec-
ommendation that the phrase be changed to information "inaccessible or
not available to the public' ' 41 and that this language be amplified by a
provision stating that publication necessarily involves "the effective disclo-
sure of inside information in such a manner sufficient to ensure its avail-
ability to the investing public."'' 0 These revisions, ultimately rejected by the
Council, would have established more clearly a higher standard of dissem-
ination, including a waiting period sufficient in length to permit the financial
press' or other media's publication of the information.'5' This "effective
145. Id. preamble.
146. The "parity of information" theory rests on the assumption that the federal securities
laws were designed to ensure that all investors have equal access to the information needed
for rational investment decisions. The SEC, in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961), applied the theory to develop under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990), an
affirmative duty to disclose any material nonpublic information prior to trading or to abstain
from trading the subject securities.
147. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
148. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). In Chiarella, the Supreme Court refused to send a financial
printer to jail on a proven charge that he used confidential information provided by his firm's
clients to reap trading profits, a clear violation of the Cady, Roberts "disclose or abstain"
rule. Instead, the Court imposed the requirement that state law must provide the foundation
of any duty to disclose under rule lOb-5. Id. at 230; see supra note 126.
149. Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 51, at 92.
150. Id. The remarkable similarity of the Hoon Report's phrase to that used in one of
the seminal cases in American insider trading jurisprudence suggests that the language was
borrowed. In SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the Second Circuit stated: "Before insiders may act upon
material information, such information must have been effectively disclosed in a manner
sufficient to insure its availability to the investing public" (emphasis added). "Otherwise," the
court explained, "insiders would be able to beat the news ... by requesting in advance that
their orders be expected immediately after the dissemination of a major news release but
before outsiders could act on the release." Id. at 853.
151. See generally L. Loss, supra note 126, at 749 n.79; 6 L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION
3605-09 (2d ed. 1961).
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dissemination" interpretation, already suggested by one expert, 52 would
serve to deny an insider the benefits of the brief window of opportunity
immediately following disclosure and prior to active trading in the subject
securities. Another commentator has expressed the view that the nonpublic
characteristic under the directive be defined by reference to the efficient
capital market hypothesis. 53 Under such a definition, significant trading by
investors must occur to "inform" the market prior to the insider's trades,
thereby disadvantaging the insider, who must delay his trades until the
subject information "corrects" the preexisting price. 54 The legislative history
of the directive reveals no consideration by the drafters of this particular
definitional approach. Despite the Council's rejection of the specific lan-
guage suggested by the European Parliament, the directive's phrase, "not
been made public," must embrace the effective dissemination concept and
certainly should not be interpreted to condone an insider's electronic footrace
to the market before the financial presses roll.
2. Precision
The secoid characteristic, that the information be of "a precise nature,"
was borrowed from France's insider trading jurisprudence, which requires
that the information be "precise, special and certain.'s French courts have
held that this restriction would exclude information consisting solely of
rumors'5 6 but would include information regarding business negotiations
when those negotiations were likely to result in a completed transaction.
57
The Commission explained that the phrase in its First Proposal, "unknown
to the public of a specific nature,' ' 58 meant that "a simple rumor cannot
therefore be regarded as inside information."' 5 9 The requirement of "pre-
cision" is foreign to United States securities laws, which require a factual
analysis under the "materiality" element of the SEC's Rule 10b-5.Iw The
directive's definition of inside information does not refer to "materiality"
but refers instead to the precision and price sensitivity characteristics. One
might argue that these two combine to establish a "materiality" element
similar to that applied under the United States securities laws. However, as
noted in the subsequent discussion of the price sensitivity characteristic, the
directive's phrase "significant effect on the price," appears to be more
restrictive in scope than the "materiality" element under United States law.
The directive's term, "of a precise nature," to be accorded any value, must
152. Hopt, supra note 47, at 58.
153. See, Note, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 3, at 251; see generally Fama,
Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970).
154. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
155. Judgment of 26 May 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1978 J.C.P. II No. 18789 (Ist case).
156. Id.
157. Judgment of 18 Apr. 1979, Trib. gr. inst., Fr., 1980 J.C.P. II No. 19306 (2nd case).
158. First Proposal, supra note 14,,art. 6.
159. Id. explanatory memorandum.
160. See infra notes 171-173 and accompanying text.
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serve as a further restriction on the types of information covered by the
directive. Accordingly, one must deal with the rather troublesome conclusion
that the combined effect of the precision and price sensitivity characteristics
may substantially reduce the scope of the inside information to be regulated
under the directive.
3. Market Information
The third characteristic, in referring to one or more issuers or to one
or more securities, is intended to establish the directive's coverage of broad
informational categories traditionally characterized as "inside information"
and "outside" or "market information." The term "inside information"
commonly includes information normally known only to management or its
agents and pertaining to the assets, earnings or securities of that manage-
ment's corporate employer.' 6' The term "market information" generally
refers to information concerning events or circumstances which affect the
market for a corporation's securities but which do not necessarily relate to
that corporation's assets or earnings.162 The Insider Trading Directive, in
contrast to American law, eliminates the distinction between the two cate-
gories of information by combining them in its definition.
The sources of information relating to the market price of a corpora-
tion's securities include traditional insiders, such as the corporation's direc-
tors, officers and support personnel, and a wide range of outsiders, such
as suppliers and creditors, lawyers, accountants, investment bankers, broker-
dealers, journalists and governmental officials. Market information, unlike
classic inside information, is source neutral. Moreover, market information,
unlike inside information, includes all information relating to the market
price of a corporation's securities, whether generated by insiders or outsiders,
whether economic or political. The information may be "hard" data re-
flecting the subject corporation's past economic performance or "soft" data
reflecting either its own or another firm's projections as to the corporation's
future economic performance. Because the directive links the information
to "one or several" issuers or securities, the covered information may relate
not directly to a particular corporation but to an entire industry or, for
that matter, to the entire economy. Indeed, one writer has observed that
even the death of a president might fall within the directive's definition of
inside information. 6 The Commission explained the extraordinary scope of
this characteristic:
161. Generally, the term "inside information" refers to "information which comes from
within the corporation or affects the price of corporate stock because of its reflection of a
corporation's expected earnings or assets." Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational
Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HAiv. L. REV. 322, 329 (1979).
162. The term "market information" has been defined as "information about events or
circumstances which affect the market for a company's securities but which do not affect the
company's assets or earning power." Fleisher, Mudheim & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into
the Responsibility to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 799 (1973). See
also Karmel, Market Information: Insider Trading, 195 N.Y.L.J. 1 (1986).
163. Hopt, supra note 47, at 59.
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[Tihis condition.., covers information concerning an issuer, whether
originating from within the issuer (for example, an increase in
profits) or outside it (for example, a bid to take it over launched
by another company). It also covers information on the situation
or prospects of one or more securities and information which is
likely to influence the market as such (for example, the decision of
a central bank to alter the discount rate). 6"
The directive, by broadly defining- market information to subsume traditional
inside information, has combined the inside and market information cate-
gories. The relating of the directive to one or more issuers and one or more
securities is both innovative and far-reaching.
The EC's refusal to make a distinction between inside and market
information is clearly consistent with its doctrinal basis for the directive,
which is oriented toward market function rather than corporate behavior.
In effect, at least with respect to this characteristic, all sources and all types
of information are covered; therefore, the proviso becomes unnecessary in
the sense that it does not impose any restriction or expansion on the term
"information." Inclusion of the proviso, however, does serve to clarify the
broad scope of the directive's trading and tipping prohibitions and certainly
negates any restrictive inference from the directive's use of the term "inside
information." The EC's decision to address the infinitely broader category
of market information, as originally recommended by the Commission in
its European Code of Conduct, 65 underscores the vehemence of the EC in
its condemnation of insider trading as an abuse of the developing unified
marketplace. This characteristic contributes enormously to the vitality of
the directive.
4. Price Sensitivity
The last of the characteristics defining the term "inside information"
is the requirement that the information, "if it were made public, would be
likely to have a significant effect on the price" of the securities. 66 This
characteristic is borrowed from the British Company Securities (Insider
Dealing) Act 1985.167 In the First Proposal the Commission used the phrase
"material effect,"'' 68 but this phrase was subsequently deleted by the Council
without explanation in favor of the phrase "significant effect."' 69 The
Commission envisaged this characteristic as a critical limitation on its
definition. The Commission explained:
All information unknown to the public is not therefore necessarily
inside information. If such were the case, the managers or directors
164. First Proposal, supra note 14, explanatory memorandum.
165. European Code of Conduct, supra note 38, at 42.
166. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
167. See supra note 8.
168. First Proposal, supra note 14, art. 6.
169. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
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or even most of the employees of a company would never be able
to carry out transactions in the securities of their companies, since
they always have information which has not been published.
1 70
This sensitivity differs considerably from the "materiality" concept that
forms a basic tenet of American securities law.1 7 1 As defined by the United
States Supreme Court in TSC Industries v. Northway,172 a material fact is
one that would have had a substantial likelihood of assuming actual signif-
icance in the investment decision of a reasonable investor or, alternatively,
of being viewed by that investor as having significantly altered the total
mix of available information. 7 3 "Materiality" focuses on an individual's
decision whether to invest; "price sensitivity" focuses, instead, on the likely
impact of the information on the market's overall pricing of the shares.
The directive, consistent with its market function objective, is only
indirectly concerned about any particular investor. A particular investor,
seeking diversification of his portfolio, might attach considerable significance
to data concerning a company's product or geographical market segments.
This information, if fully disclosed, might have only a minimal effect, if
any, on the short-term price of that company's securities. Market price, of
course, reflects not so much one investor's transaction but the composite
of all investors' decisions. While virtually all price sensitive facts under the
directive presumably would be "material," not all "material facts" are
necessarily "price sensitive." "Price sensitivity," therefore, is significantly
more restrictive than "materiality" in defining "inside information." Given
the expansive scope of the directive in combining inside and market infor-
mation, however, the price sensitivity characteristic can hardly be viewed as
a fatal flaw.
5. Definitional Limitations
During the deliberations on the First and Amended Proposals, the
breadth of the initial definition of inside information created a furor in the
British financial services industry. 174 Securities professionals expressed con-
cern that company reports produced by their research analysts might be
considered inside information and, thus, would preclude those with knowl-
edge of those reports, especially customers, from trading in the securities
to which those reports relate. Others advanced the argument that the
knowledge possessed by a prospective bidder regarding his own decision to
170. First Proposal, supra note 14, explanatory memorandum.
171. See supra text accompanying note 160.
172. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
173. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 US. 438, 438 (1976); see also Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,
485 U.S. 224 (1988).
174. See, e.g., Ensuring the 1992 Programme Isn't a Spivs' Charter; The European
Market, Fin. Times, June 19, 1989, at 2, col. 1; Dickson, EC to Have Common Rules Against
Insider Dealing, Fin. Times, June 16, 1989, at 12, col. 1; Cohen, Fidler & Dickson, City
Anger at EC Insider Proposals, Fin. Times, May 12, 1989, at 24, col. 1.
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acquire securities of a target company would be, under a literal interpretation
of the directive, price-sensitive, nonpublic, precise, market information,
which would preclude the bidder from commencing the acquisition without
first informing the market. 75 Broker-dealers and investment bankers ex-
pressed their fears that the knowledge inherent in their normal course of
trading activities would result in severe curtailment of their business.
7 6
Rather than tinker with its definition of inside information, at the time the
Council adopted the Common Position it added three recitals to the direc-
tive's preamble to alleviate these concerns. The first states that a prior
decision to buy or sell securities does not, in itself, constitute inside
information that would preclude the decision maker from executing a buy
or sell decision. 77 This is followed by a recital that activities by market-
makers, countreparties and stockbrokers with inside information who con-
fine themselves to the pursuit of their normal business of buying or selling
securities, of executing customer orders, or of engaging in price stabilization
in connection with public offerings, would not, absent other circumstances,
constitute the use of inside information.' 78 The last recital states that
estimates developed from publicly available data are not to be regarded as
inside information. 79 The addition of these recitals was obviously expedient
in placating the opposition.
B. Insiders
The definition of inside information is common to both the prohibition
on insider trading and the prohibition on tipping. Obviously, one must
possess inside information, as that term is defined, before one can take
advantage of or tip the information to others. Instead of applying the
prohibitions to all those who trade or tip, the directive establishes duties
which sequestrate possessors of inside information into two camps: Primary
insiders and secondary insiders. 80 Primary insiders are, in essence, those
who come into possession of inside information by virtue of their manage-
ment position,' their equity position as shareholders,8 2 or as a result of
access to the information by virtue of the exercise of their employment,
profession or duties. 83 Secondary insiders are those persons who do not
have such positional access to inside information but who nevertheless come
into possession of information which must have as its source, directly or
175. See sources cited supra note 174.
176. See sources cited supra note 174.
177. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, arts. 2,4. See supra notes 137-138 and
accompanying text.




1991] INSIDER TRADING IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
indirectly, primary insiders.'8 This group presumably includes both the
intended and unintended beneficiaries of inside information.
While the inside information concept, as previously stated, is source
neutral, the primary and secondary insider concepts are not. To be a primary
insider, the source must derive, directly or indirectly, from status or position.
To be a secondary insider, the source must derive from a primary insider.
Under the SEC's decision in Cady, Roberts & Co.,185 this would work a
distinction without a difference. Under the First Proposal, this was also the
case because the trading and tipping rules applied to both categories of
insiders. 8 6 However, the Council's first amendments provided the difference,
rendering the distinction critical. Primary insiders are prohibited from
trading or tipping inside information. Secondary insiders are only denied
the right to trade. They may tip as they please, although their trading
tippees may be liable under the trading rule. Consequently, in a given case
one must explore those categories further in order to comprehend the
bifurcation of these prohibitions. One must be careful, of course, not to
draw these distinctions from insider trading jurisprudence in the United
States, where positional access remains critical to liability standards based
on a tortious or contractual breach of duty to a third party. Similar to the
EC's inside information "misnomer," which incorporates inside and outside
information, the directive's view of primary insiders includes classic insid-
ers, 18 7 constructive insiders,18 and all outsiders who come into possession
of the information by virtue of their status or position. This results from
the directive's catch-all provision covering persons possessing inside infor-
mation through access by virtue of the exercise of their "employment,
profession or duties." 18 9 One writer has concluded that this clause nets all
employees, regardless of whether their access is regular or occasional,
professional insiders such as accountants and attorneys, and true outsiders
such as stock exchange employees, government officials, creditors and
suppliers, union leaders, journalists and even legislators. 9° Again, their
direct access to inside information by virtue of status or position is the sole
criterion. All others possessing inside information, from the primary insider's
sister-in-law to taxi drivers, are secondary insiders. Given the breadth of
the phrase; "employment, profession or duties," in marking the primary
insiders, the secondary insiders category is notably more restrictive.
184. Id. art. 4.
185. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
186. First Proposal, supra note 14, art.- 3. Unlike the directive in its final form, the First
Proposal imposed the tipping prohibition not only upon primary insiders but upon secondary
insiders as well.
187. See supra note 181.
188. The term "constructive insiders" has been applied to a category of corporate agents,
including underwriters, accountants, lawyers, consultants and other outsiders, who as a result
of their special relationship with the corporate entity may be deemed fiduciaries of the corporate
shareholders. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983).
189. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(l).
190. Hopt, supra note 47, at 63-64.
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The distinction between primary and secondary insiders and the breadth
of their respective definitions begs the question, "Who is left?" If the
primary insider category includes everyone from the Texas Gulf Sulphur
officers' 9' to Vincent Chiarella of Pandick Press' 92 and Foster Winans 93 of
the Wall Street Journal, and if the secondary insider category includes
everyone from Raymond Dirks194 to Barry Switzer, 9 then who else could
possibly be out there free from prosecution? The directive arguably contem-
plates a final category of liability-free traders who have neither positional
access nor a primary insider as the direct or indirect informational source.
The latter half of this disjunctive is difficult to comprehend. The broad
definition of inside information, while source neutral as between insiders
and outsiders under United States law, clearly depends on information from
primary insiders, by their definition, as the generating source. Consequently,
the supposed "third group" theoretically cannot exist. Thus, similar to
Cady, Roberts and the First Proposal, one may conclude that all persons
who take advantage of inside information "with full knowledge of the facts
by acquiring or disposing of [securities] for his own account or for the
account of a third party, either directly or indirectly,"'19 6 would be deemed
in violation of the directive's trading rule. At least for the purposes of the
trading prohibition, no meaningful distinction exists between primary and
secondary insiders or between those two categories and, if they exist, the
rest of the world's possessors of inside information.
C. Transactional Advantage
Liability under the directive's trading rule depends not only on one's
possession of inside information and one's status as a primary or secondary
insider but also on two additional elements: "Taking advantage"' 19 and
acting "with full knowledge of the facts."' 98 "Taking advantage" does not
appear problematic. The "taking advantage" element appeared in the First
Proposal and, despite the directive's numerous revisions, was adopted
without change. The directive prohibits "taking advantage ... by acquiring
or disposing of ... securities ... to which [the inside] information re-
lates."' 9 This language does not require a profit made or a loss avoided
but only an acquisition or disposition for one's own or another's account.
Although specific benefit to the trader might be presumed, it does not
appear to be required. The requisite advantage is defined as the transaction
191. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
192. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
193. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
194. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
195. SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
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itself. Similar to the SEC's Cady, Roberts rule, the transactional advantage
element supplies the formula, PI - D + T = L, i.e., possession (P) of
inside information (I) minus public disclosure (D) plus trading (T) equals
liability (L) for the primary and secondary insiders to whom the rule applies.
This simple formula reflects a regulatory indifference to whether the inside
information possessed by the insider was a significant factor in that insider's
decision to trade at a certain time or whether the insider's trading decision
was reached independently. The absence of these issues and of the obstacles
presented in their proof should facilitate the enforcement of implementing
national legislation by competent authorities. The possibility does exist,
however, that various member states may modify the transactional advantage
element by adding language that would impose proof of profit made or
loss avoided. Member states could, of course, go even further by expanding
the "taking advantage" language to require proof of transactional causation,
a causal relationship between the possession of the inside information and
the decision to trade. Enforcement of the trading rule, however, would be
hampered significantly if competent authorities were forced to show not
only that the insider traded while in possession of inside information, but
also that the insider's possession of that information was the quid pro quo
or actually motivated the trade. The causal nexus between possession and
trading should be presumed, thereby providing a bright line rule for both
investors and regulatory authorities.
D. Scienter
The required "transactional advantage," as the element of the trading
rule constituting the physical part of the offense, is limited by the further
requirement that the "taking advantage" be done with "full knowledge of
the facts," 2°° which constitutes the mental part of the offense. The "full
knowledge" language did not appear in the First Proposal, the Hoon Report,
the Parliamentary Opinion, or the Amended Proposal, but, nevertheless,
the language managed to find its way into the Common Position and was
ultimately adopted in the final directive. While the prior drafts of the
directive did not use the phrase "full knowledge of the facts" or the term
"knowingly" in the trading prohibition applicable to primary insiders, these
drafts did use the phrase "knowingly obtained the inside information" in
the trading prohibition applicable to secondary insiders. 201 In the Common
Position and final version, the term "knowingly" was deleted and the
phrase "with full knowledge of the facts" was inserted in both the primary202
and secondary insider trading prohibitions.203 One writer, concluding that
200. Id.
201. First Proposal, supra note 14, art. 3(1); Amended Proposal, supra note 73, art. 3(1).
202. Common Position, supra note 80, art. 2(1); Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3,
art. 2(1).
203. Common Position, supra note 80, art. 4; Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3,
art. 4.
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the phrase is synonymous with the term "knowingly," has stated that the
directive thereby establishes a requirement of scienter.2 4 But the scienter
requirement does not embrace an intent to deceive or defraud; it requires
only an intent to trade the securities to which the inside information relates.
That writer has stated further that "the decisive movement is the one in
which the insider knowingly gives the order or else performs the transac-
tion. ' ' 205 In other words, the phrase "with full knowledge of the facts"
simply means that "the insider knows what he does in physically ordering
the trade. ' 206 This conclusion, however, is hardly dispositive of the scienter
issue.
The directive's scienter language imposes a requirement that the primary
insider be shown to have "taken advantage" with full knowledge that the
information was, in fact, "inside information." The language obviously
was not intended to condition liability on the trader's full knowledge of the
facts constituting the entire body of the inside information itself. Rather,
liability is conditioned on the full knowledge that the partial or complete
set of facts in the trader's possession was price-sensitive, nonpublic, precise,
market information. As one commentator has opined, the directive's scienter
requirement, devoid of any link to fraud or breach of fiduciary duty,
conditions liability on proof that the insider had actual knowledge, not that
he "should have known," that the information possessed constituted "inside
information.' '207 This accords with the position of the British, who objected
to prior drafts of the directive which "did not require a primary insider to
know that the information that he had was inside information." 208 The
British objections were withdrawn following the Council's inclusion of the
phrase "with full knowledge of the facts" in the Common Position.2°9 What
remains unclear is whether the full knowledge element of the trading rule
requires a further showing not only that the insider had knowledge that the
data possessed was inside information but also that the insider had as his
purpose, aim or design the violation of the directive's trading prohibition.
Because the directive provides no guidance on the issue of whether the
trader's knowledge or objective, or a combination of the two, is necessary
to satisfy the scienter requirement, member states have been left with
considerable discretion in fashioning various mens rea elements of the
offense.
E. Additional Elements of the Trading Rule
The four common elements discussed above establish the directive's
trading rule as applied to primary insiders. In a separate article of the
204. Hopt, supra note 47, at 67.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Note, A Comparative Analysis, supra note 3, at 239.
208. Changes in Insider Rules Make Directive 'Useful,' 2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No.
14, at 2 (June 21, 1989).
209. Id.
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directive, the application of the trading rule is extended to secondary
insiders-those persons other than primary insiders who possess inside
information which directly or indirectly derives from a primary insider.210
The primary insider source, as noted previously, goes to the definition of
secondary insiders and, perhaps, might be viewed solely as the definitional
criteria for the "insider" status element under the trading rule. Nevertheless,
proof of source clearly is a supplementary condition to liability for those
other than primary insiders who purportedly engage in insider trading in
violation of the directive. However, given its broad definitions of inside
information and primary insiders, the directive states a limitation which
confounds one's imagination. Although the limitation to primary source
information negatively infers that inside information might exist which does
not have a primary source, a rational search for that phantom data can
only be futile.
The futility of the search and, indeed, the superfluity of the primary
insider source limitation become obvious when one considers the secondary
insider's options as to source under his peculiar trading rule. If the secondary
insider gains the information by virtue of the exercise of his employment
or duties, then he becomes a primary insider, and his trade is prohibited
by the trading rule as applied to primary insiders. This is the likely fate of
most would-be secondary insiders. If he steals the information from a
primary insider through industrial espionage or otherwise, then his source
is clearly the primary insider. Contrary to United States law, the EC's
secondary insider trading rule applies regardless of whether the inside
information was legally provided to or wrongfully obtained by the tippee
or any other secondary insider. 21' If the secondary insider discovers the
information fortuitously in a misdirected telefax, a lost briefcase, or in an
overheard conversation, all emanating from a primary insider, his source
clearly is that primary insider. If he receives a lawful or unlawful tip from
a third party regarding inside information originally emanating from a
primary insider, his source is, at least "indirectly," a primary insider.
Virtually all information is, of course, "inside" if it is nonpublic, precise,
price-sensitive, market information. All such information by definition
initially must be generated by primary insiders, whether company manage-
ment or employees, journalists, bankers or government agents. The second-
ary insider, therefore, might be a nontippee, a tippee, a subtippee, or a
sub-subtippee. According to one writer, "the whole chain ... is caught,"
and it is unnecessary to prove who was the primary insider or where the
leak has occurred.212 The trader's status as a secondary insider results from
his not being a primary insider and from his possession of inside infor-
mation. The primary source language does not restrict the directive's ap-
plicability. The language serves only to reaffirm the distinct status of the
210. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 4.
211. See supra note 126.
212. Hopt, supra note 47, at 71.
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secondary insider and the linkage between the information he possesses and
the primary insider from which that information must necessarily emanate.
Once his status as a secondary insider is established, the trader should look
not to the source of the information but to the scienter element when he
seeks to defend his securities trades against attack under the directive.
F. Additional Elements of the Tipping Rule
The Insider Trading Directive's tipping rule incorporates two of the
common elements previously analyzed: Inside information and the possession
of that information by a primary insider. Once these elements are estab-
lished, one of two predicate acts must be shown: (1) The disclosure to a
third party (unless in the normal course of the primary insider's exercise of
his employment, profession or duties); 213 or (2) the recommendation or
procurement of a third party, on the basis of that information, to acquire
or dispose of the securities to which the information relates.214 Thus, the
tipping rule bans both selective disclosure and tipping activities, respectively.
The tipping rule, like the trading rule, requires no fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty or other wrongful behavior in tort or contract. Unlike the directive's
trading rule, the tipping rule does not require that the primary insider act
with scienter; it completely omits the language "knowingly" or "with full
knowledge of facts."
The first of the alternative predicate acts to liability under the tipping
rule is the prohibition on disclosure to a third party.21s The disclosure
prohibition relates only to inside information which, by definition, has not
been disclosed to the investing public. This broad ban on disclosure to the
favored few goes significantly further than the ban on insider trading. The
primary insider is not only denied the right to trade but is also denied the
right to discriminate among investors or others in sharing inside information.
While the trading rule, as applied to both primary and secondary insiders,
would prohibit trading based on inside information, the tipping rule is
designed to keep the inside information out of the market until disseminated
to investors generally. Thus, would-be recipients of the selective disclosure
are deprived of opportunifies to refrain from trading based on that infor-
mation, the "omission of transactions" area that insider trading regulation
historically has failed to address. 2 6 Moreover, potential chains of tippees
and subtippees are pretermitted by a rule that does not require knowledge,
213. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(a).
214. Id. art. 3(b).
215. Id. art. 3(a).
216. Those who possess inside information benefit considerably in the development of
trading strategies that include decisions not to buy and not to sell securities at a given time.
The obvious advantages to non-trading insiders resulting from informational asymmetries
cannot be affected by the trading rule but can be reduced significantly by the current disclosure
rule and the tipping rule. Assuming compliance, these two rules serve, respectively, to limit
the duration of the advantage by requiring prompt public disclosure and to limit access to the
information by proscribing selective disclosure to others.
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or a reasonable belief, that the tippee will engage in trading activities based
on the disclosed information. In fact, no likely or actual trading by the
recipient tippees is required under the disclosure rule. Certainly, the disclo-
sure restraint, if fully implemented, will contribute to the goal of infor-
mational parity. The restraint is subject, however, to the potentially far-
reaching exception "unless disclosure is made in the normal course of the
exercise of his employment, profession or duties. 21 7 The breadth of the
"normal course" exception to the disclosure restraint of the tipping rule is
difficult to predict. Undoubtedly, financial services firms will advance
arguments that this exception is intended to sanitize communications between
issuers on the one hand and financial analysts and portfolio managers on
the other, who seek inside information in order to make forecasts and risk
allocations. Others will argue that the exception permits cracks in the
"Chinese walls" of brokerage firms and universal banks where disclosure
of inside information on one side of the wall is considered necessary to
protect the beneficiaries of the firm's "duties" on the other side of that
wall. 218 The unexplained adoption of the vague "normal course" exception
is highly suspect and could seriously undermine the EC's policy objectives.
This exception conceivably could swallow the rule.
The second of the tipping rule's alternative predicate acts is the prohi-
bition on recommending or procuring a third party to trade the securities
to which the inside information relates. 2 9 This provision prohibits the inside
information-based "hot tip," without regard to whether that underlying
inside information actually is disclosed. This "hot tip" rule adds needed
clarity to the EC's insider trading jurisprudence. It recognizes the "hot tip"
as the burning essence of a large mass of inside information. In doing so,
the rule sidesteps conventional defensive arguments that the "hot tip,"
without more, is only rumor and that no actual inside information was
revealed. The "hot tip" rule should be viewed as an impressive advance in
insider trading regulation.
Most unfortunately, the EC did not extend the tipping rule to secondary
insiders. The Commission and the European Parliament, as described pre-
viously, strongly supported the rules's application to both primary and
secondary insiders.22 Faced with powerful opposition from the financial
services industry, the Council excluded tippees and other secondary insiders
in adopting its Common Position. 2 Subsequently, the European Parliament
struggled in vain to have the rule reimposed on tippees and other secondary
insiders.2n Instead, the Council added language to the directive authorizing
the member states, in their discretion, to extend application of the tipping
217. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(a).
218. See N. POSER, INTERNATIONAL SEcuRrrIS REGULATION: LONDON'S "BIG BANG" AND
Tim EURoPE"N SECURITEns MARKETS 227-236 (1991).
219. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 3(b).
220. See supra notes 87, 93, 186 and accompanying text.
221. Common Position, supra note 80, art. 3.
222. Second Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 92, at 54.
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rule to secondary insiders. 223 The achievement of a basic insider trading
prohibition in most of the member states will become reality only as a
result of the EC mandate set forth in the directive. Without a similar
mandate for extending the tipping rule to secondary insiders, national
legislation with more stringent and broader application is sheer fantasy at
the present time.
V. THE EXCLUSIONS FROM THE TRADING AND TIPPING RULES
The Insider Trading Directive contains a number. of important exclusions
from coverage. Similar to the host of exclusions in other areas of regulation,
the directive's exclusions are likely to reduce the overall effectiveness of the
trading and tipping rules to be adopted by the member states. Several of
these exclusions have been mentioned previously, including those related to
a bidder's takeover decisions, 224 analysts' estimates developed from publicly
available data, 221 and normal market making, brokerage and stabilization
activities by investment firms, the knowledge of which might have otherwise
constituted possession of inside information. n 6 The exclusion of secondary
insiders from the tipping rule also has been discussed at length.2 7 In addition
to these, the directive sets forth other noteworthy exclusions. Communica-
tion of inside information to regulatory authorities is excluded from the
directive's tipping rules. 22 Governmental transactions taken in pursuit of
national monetary, exchange rate or public debt management policies are
excluded from the directive. 229 In language that can only be described as
obfuscated, the directive permits the member states to exclude from coverage
all face to face transactions taking place outside a regulated market and
not involving a professional intermediary. 20 Finally, the directive does not
apply to corporations and other legal persons but only to natural persons
acting individually or on the legal person's behalf.
23'
223. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 6. Article 6 provides:
Each Member State may adopt provisions more stringent than those laid down by
this Directive or additional provisions, provided that such provisions are applied
generally. In particular it may extend the scope of the prohibition laid down in
Article 2 [the trading rule] and impose on persons referred to in Article 4 [secondary





227. See supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
228. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, preamble.
229. Id. art. 2(4).
230. Id. art. 2(3). This exclusion, while hardly salutary, is consistent with the directive's
focus on market function and the consequential disregard for the position of individual
investors. If the transaction is truly off-market and a market professional is not involved, then
the participants in the transaction are unaffected by the directive's rules. Member states, of
course, have the authority to extend the scope of the prohibition. See supra note 223.
231. Id. art. 2(2).
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The exclusion from coverage of legal persons finds its origin in the
British and French insider trading laws, which, in their relatively brief
history, have not recognized civil or criminal liability for insider trading
violations by corporations. 232 Borrowing from the French law, the Commis-
sion, in its Amended Proposal, added language applying the trading rule
to de jure or de facto directors in cases where the insider trading has been
conducted on behalf of a legal person.233 This provision, according to one
writer, would have made corporate directors "automatically and strictly




Others expressed the view that violations by subordinates would result in
liability being imposed on corporate directors who neither approved nor
were aware of the wrongful transactions. 2 5 In response to these objections,
the Council revised the Commission's language to impose liability only on
those "natural persons who take part in the decision to carry out the
transaction for the account of the legal person concerned." 236 The imposition
of personal liability on those individual corporate personnel directly partic-
ipating in an insider trading scheme should serve as a powerful deterrent
while commendably avoiding economic harm to the innocent shareholders
of the corporate entity. However, these benefits must be balanced against
the provision's reduction, indeed arguable elimination, of vicarious liability.
If no liability is imposed on either the corporation or its board of directors,
then the corporation has little or no incentive to establish and enforce
internal compliance programs. The directive, unlike recent insider trading
legislation enacted in the United States, 237 fails to establish any prohibitions
or regulatory incentives that would mandate or encourage corporate re-
sponsibility for insider trading by corporate employees. The absence of
controlling person liability, 238 respondeat superior 239 or any statutory require-
232. Wallace, WhO is Subject to the Prohibition Against Insider Trading: A Comparative
Study of American, British and French Law, 15 Sw. U.L. REv. 217, 277 (1985).
233. Amended Proposal, supra note 73, art. 1(2).
234. Dine, supra note 3, at 23.
235. See, e.g., Cohen, Fidler & Dickson, supra note 174; A Daft Draft, supra note 24,
at 86-87.
236. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 2(2).
237. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). The Insider Trading and
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act subjects investment firms and other controlling persons to
substantial penalties for failing to take appropriate steps to prevent "insider trading," still
undefined, by their employees. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(b)(1) (1988). See generally Friedman, The
Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 68 N.C. L. REV. 465 (1990).
238. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988), extends
liability for the acts of one person to another, who, through stock ownership, agency or
agreement, "controls" that person. The SEC, in rule 12b-2, has defined the term "control"
to mean "the possession, direct or indirect, of the power to direct..the management and
policies of a person, whether through the ownership of voting securities , by contract or
otherwise." 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1991).
239. The common law doctrine of respondeat superior deems an employer liable for all
acts of an employee committed within the scope of employment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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ments for internal control and surveillance systems represents a major
weakness in the directive. Moreover, this deficiency may undermine the
EC's commitment to the efficacy of its insider trading prohibitions.
VI. PENALTIES AND ENFORCEMENT
The Insider Trading Directive, after having broadly proscribed both
trading and tipping, collapses in its failure to establish the criminal nature
of the two prohibitions and the types and severities of the penalties and
other remedies that must be imposed by the member states. The EC, after
rejecting calls for harmonized civil and criminal remedies, 240 opted for the
following standard: "The penalties shall be sufficient to promote compliance
with those measures [enacted pursuant to the directive]. "241 The directive's
language provides an extraordinarily wide margin of discretion to the
member states as they undertake the transformation of the directive. This
deficiency illustrates, even more than the exclusion of liability for legal
persons, the absence of intense regulatory concern over insider trading
abuses. It also illustrates, as one must concede, the enormous political
obstacles confronting the Commission in its valiant attempt to reverse
decades of European regulatory indifference. 242
One can only engage in informed speculation as to the probable result
of transformation. Some member states, like Germany, may provide merely
for the disgorgement of trading profits, a civil remedy that results in a loss
no greater than one's gain.2 3 Despite the directive's authorization to member
states to adopt more stringent measures than those mandated, 244 the direc-
tive's failure to require a minimum level of penalties or even to define the
prohibited conduct as criminal encourages the member states to enact
legislation that simply passes muster. Because no harmonization of penalties
or other remedies is required, few member states are likely to opt for harsh
penalties that might place their capital markets at a regulatory disadvantage.
Moreover, the absence of an EC mandate for harmonized penalties leaves
member states' authorities unarmed in their efforts to overcome domestic
political recalcitrance to an enhanced regulatory scheme. The result of the
EC's failure to prescribe harmonized criminal penalties and civil remedies
is likely to be a patchwork of twelve widely disparate regimes with an array
AGENCY § 228 (1958). See Musewicz, Vicarious Employer Liability and Section 10(b): In
Defense of the Common Law, 50 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 754 (1982).
240. Hoon Report, supra note 52, at 10; Parliamentary Opinion, supra note 51, at 92-
93.
241. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 13.
242. The Commission traditionally has not specified actual sanctions in its proposed
directives; rather, the Commission has followed the principle that sanctions should remain the
exclusive prerogative of the member states. This principle should be abandoned if regulatory
harmony is to be achieved.
243. See Hopt, European Directive, supra note 3, at 75-76.
244. See supra note 223.
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of hard and soft sanctions easily exploited by those intent on profiting from
the disparities.
Enforcement may prove equally disastrous to the efficacy of the direc-
tive. Although frequent suggestions have been put forward for a suprana-
tional securities regulatory agency for the EC,245 they have received no
serious consideration to date. The directive requires each member state to
designate a competent authority or set of authorities to ensure that the
implementing legislation is applied. 246 These competent authorities must be
provided both supervisory and investigatory powers necessary to perform
their enforcement responsibilities. 247 They are required to cooperate with
each other in fulfilling their enforcement function, including the exchange
of information. 248 The benefits from member states' cooperation in their
enforcement efforts should be strongly complemented by the Council of
Europe's recently adopted Convention on Insider Trading and its Protocol.
249
The directive's requirements for collaborative national agencies with inves-
tigatory and supervisory powers, viewed optimistically, could lead to a
cooperative enforcement network which might evolve into, or influence the
development of, a centralized secretariat, which, in turn, might ultimately
be given independent regulatory authority.250 A central authority would
contribute enormously to the coordination of the enforcement network
envisaged by the directive and to the development of enhanced EC inside
trading standards and increasingly harmonized national legislation.25' One
must remain hopeful that the directive is just the first step on the path to
a comprehensive and effectively enforced insider trading regulatory scheme.
2
VII. CONCLUSION
The EC, in its adoption of the Insider Trading Directive, has achieved
a major advance in the development of a supranational securities code for
245. See Warren, supra note 25, at 231.
246. See supra note 56.
247. Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 8(2).
248.
Id. art. 10(1); see supra note 89.
249. Convention on Insider Trading, opened for signature Apr. 20, 1989, Europ. T.S.
No. 130. See Lowry, The International Approach to Insider Trading: The Council of Europe's
Convention, 1990 J. Bus. L. 460.
250. See Warren, supra note 25, at 231.
251. See Id.
252. The Insider Trading Directive, according to one commentator, was conceived as "a
first step towards an increasingly effective system for combating insider trading." Fornasier,
supra note 70, at 169. The directive provides that the "Contact Committee," established under
the Admissions Directive, supra note 31, would have as additional functions:
(a) to permit regular consultation on any practical problems which arise from the
application of this Directive and on which exchanges of view are deemed useful;
(b) to advise the Commission if necessary, on any additions or amendments to be
made to this Directive.
Insider Trading Directive, supra note 3, art. 12. Thus, a mechanism has been put in place to
oversee issues likely to arise during the process of transformation.
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the common market. The EC must be credited with being the first body to
establish multinational insider trading laws. It also must be credited with
defining an offense that the United States Congress and the SEC have never
been willing or able to define. Moreover, the EC, in developing its trading
and tipping rules, has avoided the duty-based jurisprudence that has been
the curse of insider trading laws in the United States. Under the EC's three
substantive rules, regulatory authorities in the member states need not
demonstrate any breach of duty, whether in tort or contract, as those duties
vary from member state to member state. These authorities, instead, must
look to the directive's three specific statutory prohibitions as transformed
into their respective national laws.
The directive's first general rule is that insiders in possession of inside
information, a term defined to include market information, cannot trade.
The term "insider," combining primary and secondary insiders, embraces
virtually all traders who possess inside information. The directive's second
general rule is that primary insiders may not disclose inside information
selectively, regardless of any exploitative design or activity by those favored
with the disclosure and regardless of whether the inside information itself
is'disclosed or is transmitted in its bare essence in the form of a "hot tip"
recommending a trade. The EC's third general rule is not prohibitory, but
prophylactic, and applies not to insiders, but to issuers of securities. This
rule requires publicly-held issuers to disclose promptly all major new de-
velopments which might lead to substantial movement in their share prices
and thereby reduces insider trading opportunities in the marketplace. Finally,
the directive obliges each of the member states to designate or establish
regulatory agencies, with full investigatory and supervisory powers, to
enforce these trading, tipping and disclosure rules, both independently and
in cooperation with each other. Because insider trading is increasingly
multijurisdictional in scope, involving opposite traders, professional inter-
mediaries, and securities markets that may be located in different nations,
multistate cooperation in enforcement has become essential.23 The directive
envisages a cooperative network of member state authorities sharing common
goals, common rules and common zeal in enforcing the insider trading
prohibitions.
253. A former SEC Commissioner has underscored the necessity for international coop-
eration in policing the world's integrated securities markets:
Securities fraud is more than an international problem that requires an international
solution. The reality of today's marketplace is that if we fail to develop effective
means of international cooperation none of us will be able to enforce even our own
laws against our citizens trading in our own domestic markets. Thus, either we learn
to cooperate in the international area or we surrender our domestic regulatory
regimes and resign ourselves to a world in which securities and other financial
regulations are mere statements of symbolic aspirations that are evaded with impunity
by international traders.
Grundfest, International Cooperation in Securities Enforcement: A New United States Initiative,
Address at King's College, London (Nov. 9, 1988).
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Despite the EC's vision and its imperative to the member states, the
member states do not share the values of an American jurisprudence that
"abhors insider trading with a fervor reserved for those who scoff at
motherhood, apple pie and baseball. ' 254 The moral and political compro-
mises reached during the development of the Insider Trading Directive
provide ample evidence of their mellow approach to this stubbornly resistant
form of market abuse. The final directive, while firmly establishing insider
trading as a European sin, replete with a common moral text, fails to unite
its trading and tipping rules against all insiders, whether primary or sec-
ondary, in possession of inside information. Further, the directive provides
a diluted version of the materiality criterion used in its definition of inside
information. But these deficiencies pale when compared with more signifi-
cant regulatory lapses in the directive. Corporate entities, as legal persons,
are exempted from direct liability under the trading and tipping rules.
Although those individual agents "who take part in the decision" are
subject to the prohibitions, the entity, as well as its governing board, is
freed from vicarious liability. Thus, corporate management, by refraining
from involvement in trading decisions, has no regulatory incentive to ensure
the required behavior of its personnel. The directive imposes no requirements
on corporate employers to develop internal compliance programs, contrac-
tual restraints, or surveillance procedures designed to reduce or control
violations by either employees or other agents. Moreover, the directive fails
to state that insider trading shall be a crime, fails to state any minimum
jail sentences and fines, and fails to state any administrative or civil remedies
or sanctions. Because remedial measures are left to the discretion of the
twelve member states, governed solely by the standard "sufficient to promote
compliance," little hope remains for the degree of harmonization the
directive seeks to achieve, even on its face. Lax enforcement will' only
compound the dilemma.
The directive, despite its inherent weaknesses, does allow one sanguine
view. Its triplex of rules, should contribute both to increased regulatory
parity and to a significant elevation of preexisting regulatory thresholds. By
mandating statutory prohibitions, even without common penalties, in each
of the member states, the EC has thrown the full weight of the union it
constitutes behind its moral and legal condemnation of behavior previously
regarded as an acceptable norm in the business ethics of the European
marketplace. The directive is a first, giant step toward the EC's interrelated
goals of harmonization and improved market function. The Commission
should zealously monitor the directive's transformation into national laws
and the enforcement of those rules. Having leaped the barriers necessary
to secure any insider trading legislation from its constituents, the Commis-
sion is better positioned to initiate revisions in the future. Viewed as the
first step of a number to come, the directive is a remarkable achievement
for the EC's securities markets and the global investor.
254. Cox, supra note 119, at 628.
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